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In July 1954, the Geneva Accords set up a mechanism by which 
the war between the French and the Vietnamese would end and 
peace would be established m Vietnam. According to the agreements, 
Vietnam was to be divided temporarily into two sectors. The country 
was to be reunited in July 1956 after a nationwide election. 
The United States, having supported the French effort to retain 
its colony, was determined to prevent a Communist government in 
Vietnam. U.S. intelligence, however, acknowledged that the 
Communists would win if an election were held. Therefore, the 
United States tried to set up a friendly government in Vietnam. At 
the same time, U.S. officials decided to block the election through the 
support of the South Vietnamese government. Documents 
declassified by the U.S. government, plus other primary and 
secondary sources, illustrate the extent to which U.S. officials were 
involved in the subversion of the election, a topic about which little 
has been written. 
The United States, which was ostensibly trying to export 
freedom throughout the world, successfully prevented the election 
from taking place. While claiming that the Vietnamese were not 
ready for independence, the American effort was actually an early 
Cold War struggle, with Vietnam as a battlefield. The issue of the 
election, which the Vietminh were counting on, helped form a 
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IV 
INTRODUCTION 
If elementary logic - the only kind wartime 
could accommodate - required the enemy to be totally 
evil, it required the Allies to be totally good - all of 
them. The opposition between this black and this white 
was clear and uncomplicated, untroubled by subtlety 
or nuance, let alone irony or skepticism. ... In the 
absence of doubt, and with the positive enjoying 
constant accentuation, the view easily developed that 
Americans were by nature, by instinct really, morally 
wonderf ul.1 
The United States set forth after World War II intent upon 
sowing the world with its seeds of success, which was affirmed by 
its victory, wealth, power and escape from the war's destruction. 
Twenty-eight years later, rn 1973, the United States' postwar 
dominance in the world would end with its withdrawal from 
Vietnam. 
Historians and journalists smce then have filled libraries with 
analyses of what went wrong. Much of it focuses on President 
Lyndon Johnson's failed policy of escalation. Some blame President 
John F. Kennedy for sending in the first U.S. soldiers. 
1 Paul Fussell, Wartime: Understanding and Behavior in the Second World 
War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 164-165. 
1 
But the U.S. role in Vietnam during the 1960s was, ironically, 
only a product of an unintended domino effect, one that started in 
1945, when the United States took on the role of global policeman, 
and accelerated in 1950, when the United States decided to help the 
French in their fight to maintain Vietnam as a colony. 
U.S. foreign policy between 1950, at the height of the Franco-
Vietnamese war, and 1959, when hostilities erupted between the 
North and the South, was the foundation of what would be the U.S.-
Vietnam War. To understand why the United States was there and 
why it failed, the context in which that policy was formed must be 
understood. That context included more than the U.S. desire for 
containment of Communism. It was also a morality play, a function 
of arrogance, and a willingness to reach an end using any means, 
regardless of how those means contradicted the morals preached. 
It is possible to view the context in which policy toward 
Vietnam was formed through the lens of one issue that has been 
largely ignored by historians: the planned reunification of North 
and South Vietnam, a product of the Geneva Conference in 1954, 
which ended France's failed attempt to hold onto its colony . The 
Geneva agreements - which were signed by Vietnam, France, and 
Great Britain in July 1954 - stipulated that the war would end with 
a temporary division of Vietnam at the 17th parallel. An election 
would be held in · I 956, according to the agreements, to unify the 
nation once more. In the meantime, anyone living in Vietnam could 
move to the South or the North, and military action would stop. 
The election never happened. It was blocked by the United 
States and the South Vietnamese, who set up a separate 
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government. The reunification was delayed by nearly twenty years 
until 1975, when Communist forces took Saigon. Yet, the election 
issue, upon which Ho Chi Minh based his willingness to come to 
terms with the French after his victory over them at Dienbienphu, 
has been given relatively little attention by historians of the war. 
One reason may be that the history of the war, unlike that of other 
wars, belongs to the losers. The side that won gleaned little in the 
way of spoils and had long ago lost its intelligentsia to the colonial 
domination of the French. Postwar efforts focused on rebuilding the 
country, not studying the cause of the war. For the side that lost, 
however, the war became a breeding ground for its massive 
publishing machinery, which spewed forth a torrent of histories 
that have consistently failed, with a few exceptions, to try to 
understand the winners. 
Understanding what drove a tiny, war-ravaged, poverty-
stricken country to outlast France and then the United States is 
possible only by understanding the political machinations that led 
to the military clash. If the Vietnam War proved nothing else, it 
proved that politics cannot be separated from the wagmg of war. 
Once this premise is accepted, it is clear that the issue of the unheld 
election of 1956, and what the United States did to help sabotage it, 
is a synecdoche for the misdirected Vietnam policy that plagued 
American officials for more than 20 years. In the two years after 
Geneva - when the United States replaced France as the major 
external power m Vietnam - it became apparent to U.S. officials that 
Ho would easily win any election. The election, therefore, was a 
paradox for the United States: If it were to be held, the allegedly 
3 
anti-democratic Communists would wm. If it were subverted, "free 
Vietnam" would be saved. After Secretary of State John Foster 
Dulles realized that he had to subvert an election to preserve 
"democracy," it was a very short road to burning down a village in 
order to save it. 
An examination of the election issue, and why the United 
States believed the election should not take place, offers insight into 
postwar American attitudes and assumptions about the United 
States' role in the world. The foreign policy upon which those 
attitudes and assumptions were based deeply affected millions of 
people around the globe. Despite what eventually happened m 
Vietnam, they are still in place and are having much the same 
effect. American intervention throughout the world has often been 
based on faith and morality, not always of need, and it has carried 
with it some leaps of faith and logic that have not served the United 
States well. How and why the Vietnamese election of 1956 was 
subverted sheds some light on the U.S. need for intervention in 
other countries. Since that need still exists, the election issue, 
though nearly 35 years old, retains its relevance. 
4 
POSTWAR U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN VIETNAM 
The Geneva Accords stipulated that an election would be held 
on July 20, 1956, to reunify the country after two years of 
demilitarization. To understand why that election was never held, 
thanks largely to the Eisenhower administration, it is necessary to 
examme the basis for U.S. foreign policy after the end of World War 
II. 
U.S. policy toward Vietnam from 1945 to 1950 was, m 
essence, a tightrope act. American policy makers tried to maintain 
at least an ostensible commitment to independence for colonized 
peoples while trying to forge an alliance with Western Europe to 
offset the perceived Soviet threat. The result was a mostly tacit 
approval of the French effort to regain its colonies in Indochina, 
which had fallen to the Japanese during World War II. From the 
time war broke out in Indochina in 1946, after Ho Chi Minh 
declared Vietnam independent, until 1950, the United States stayed 
out of the fray. State Department officials were divided over policy 
toward colonial independence, but the European bias in the agency 
won out, and the perceived need to mollify France took precedence 
over the struggles of the colonized. Peace and security in Indochina 
were the U.S. concerns as U.S. officials planned a Western alliance in 
response toward a perceived threat from the Soviet Union. 2 As far 
2 George McT. Kahin, Intervention: How America Became Involved in 
Vietnam (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1987), pp. 5-7 passim. 
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as Secretary of State Dean Acheson was concerned, the Vietnamese 
weren't capable of democracy, anyway. "These people," he said, "are 
about 95 or 96 percent illiterate. They do not have the simplest 
ideas of social organization. They do not know about starting 
schools. They do not know about dealing with the most primitive 
ideas of public health. They do not know how to organize to build 
roads. Government is something of a mystery." He said foreign 
advisers were needed there "... to show them the simple things 
about what is a school district, and what is the area that falls within 
a school district, how you go about collecting taxes, and how you get 
teachers; how to teach the children, whether you have desks or 
chairs and so forth. "3 Dulles shared this preconception. "I don't 
know really whether some of these people are qualified, well 
qualified yet for independence," he told the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee. "I am not sure that these people are qualified 
to be fully independent. "4 The Vietnamese, Dulles said, were "not 
capable" of exercising as much independence as India, Australia, or 
Canada.5 Few U.S. officials, if any, bothered to point out that 
Vietnam had a culturally and politically rich background before the 
French colonized it. This attitude, that the colonized were not 
capable of democracy, would speak volumes when the United States 
3 William Conrad Gibbons, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War: 
Executive and Legislative Relationships: Part 1, 1945-1960 (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 49-50 . 
4 U.S. Senate , Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 
Vol. VI, 83rd Congress, Second Session , 1954, p. 23. 
5 Ibid ., p. 24. 
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came to its decision to subvert the election planned for 1956 m 
Vietnam. 
Since the Soviet Union had little interest in Indochina, the 
United States also had little before 1950. While Soviet interest 
would remam low, American interest changed dramatically after 
1949, when Mao was victorious and China was "lost." The 
Communist monolith had grown a second head, and Southeast Asia 
was within breathing distance. The brush fires that the Truman 
Doctrine promised to extinguish were multiplying, according to this 
belief, and Indochina changed almost overnight from a mmor 
problem for the French to a major international concern. Problems 
had already been, or were about to be, sparked in Greece, Turkey, 
the Philippines , Guatemala, Iran, Malaya and Indonesia. With China 
now Communist, all of Asia, especially Japan, was now allegedly at 
risk. Indochina became the first line of defense against a feared 
domino effect originating with the Chinese, who were thought to 
have designs on the area. 
The United States began its war against Vietnam not under 
Johnson or Kennedy but under Truman, in April 1950, when U.S. 
officials decided that Vietnam was too important now to fall to the 
Communists. That was when Truman signed National Security 
Council 64, which set forth U.S. policy toward Indochina and made it 
a high-priority concern for American national security. It was based 
on the domino theory. Thailand and Burma were expected to fall if 
Indochina fell to the Communists, and the rest of Southeast Asia 
would be in danger. The U.S. charge in Saigon, Edmund Gullion, 
summarized the new policy in a cable on May 6, 1950: Indochina 
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was a "neuralgic focus" for the Communists, as was Greece, he said. 
The United States had to resist Communist penetration and send in 
troops if the Russians or Chinese used force. 
This flexible concept envisages [the] possibility [of] 
limited use of U.S. force, takes [into] account [the] 
possibility [of] checking [the] threat by [a] display [of] 
determination and reckons with [the] twilight zone in 
our constitutional system between [the] war making 
power of [the] executive and legislative branches. It 
envisages our going as far as we did in Greece and 
farther than was ever announced we would go. It is 
derivative of [the] Truman doctrine. Its execution at any 
given time depends on [the] relative military posture of 
ourselves and [the] potential enemy, particularly in 
atomic weapons. 6 
By June 1950, the Cold War had heated up in Korea. The war 
there reinforced U.S. officials' belief in containment and the domino 
effect, a belief which made the transition from Acheson to his 
successor, John Foster Dulles. The policy of containment from this 
point on would supersede any U.S. policy regarding colonial 
independence. The needs of colonized peoples throughout the world 
often conflicted with America's desire to influence world events and 
make sure that the "Communist bloc's" sphere did not expand. 
Struggles for independence, as long as they were in the Communist 
sphere, were acceptable to U.S. policy makers; those in the U.S. 
sphere merely served to subvert the security America needed to 
maintain control. Security in the periphery - i.e., beyond Europe -
was needed to make sure Europe remained committed to U.S. policy. 
6 Gibbons, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War. pp. 67-68. 
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This European bias is what suddenly changed Vietnam from a 
minor player on the geopolitical stage to a cornerstone of the 
Truman Doctrine and containment. It was, to a significant degree, a 
product of the mindset of John Foster Dulles, Eisenhower's secretary 
of state. Eisenhower and Dulles had risen to power on the wave of 
anti-Communism sweeping the country m the early 1950s. They 
were helped along by the right wing of the U.S. Senate - including 
Senators William Know land, Robert Taft and Joseph McCarthy - who 
blamed the Democrats for losing China. Dulles, who had been an 
adviser to Acheson on Far Eastern affairs, was deeply troubled by 
the Communist victory in China and by 1950 he was calling the 
situation in the Far East "most acute."7 Publicly, Indochina was a 
crucial area for John Foster Dulles. Privately, it was just a place on a 
map where Communism had to be stopped. "Indochina as such 1s of 
no great importance, that is, in terms of its military potential or m 
terms of its economic resources," he told the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee in executive session. "It is important primarily 
as a staging ground for any further advance "8 
Although Acheson laid the foundation for U.S. involvement in 
Vietnam, Dulles was the original architect. His fervent anti-
Communism and preconceived notions of world order and its moral 
structure framed U.S. policy in Vietnam for the next quarter 
century. Dulles came to the State Department with fairly clearly 
developed attitudes about the role the United States should play in 
7 Ronald W. Pruessen, John Foster Dulles: The Road to Power (New York, N.Y.: 
The Free Press, 1982), p. 436. 
8 U.S. Senate, Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 
Vol. VII, 84th Congress, First Session, 1955, p. 7. 
9 
world affairs. Like Truman, Acheson, and many other Americans, 
Dulles believed the Soviet Union was "evil and diabolical" and intent 
upon world domination, and that a Soviet victory anywhere in the 
world could lead to the loss of Latin America, Africa and even 
Europe to Communism. He believed that Stalin had targeted 
nationalists in colonized countries as proxies in an effort to subvert 
capitalism, and that Ho Chi Minh was one of those proxies. 
Dulles believed it was the United States' role to help reform 
the world's political structure. His evidence was the Americans' 
alleged superiority - not military or economic superiority but moral 
superiority. Americans were Christians, according to this argument, 
and therefore it was their duty to spread out amongst the 
unenlightened. "Salvation," "devout," "moral power" - these were 
the words Dulles used during the 1950s to justify the new role the 
United States was to play in the world. Only the United States could 
break the shackles of the oppressed. "Resistance cannot be 
organized except around the United States," Dulles said.9 
Dulles applied this European/Christian/Western outlook to the 
Asian/non-Christian/Eastern problems in Vietnam and Indochina as 
a whole. The first thing he did was to rationalize how the 
Vietnamese people's shackles had been strapped on by the 
Christian French. "It was Christianity .. . that had made tolerable the 
worldwide political master of the West and that now makes it 
possible to have a peaceful transition from that mastery to 
freedom," Dulles said. "People of the East feel a sense of fellowship 
9 Pruessen, John Foster Dulles, p. 446. 
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with the West, largely because of what Christianity has done for 
them." lO This ignorance about Vietnamese history and the history 
of the colonized in general seems quaintly insignificant nearly 40 
years later, but it is a major reason why the United States 
continuously subverted the democratic process in Vietnam after 
1950 and ultimately shed its blood there. It is why the United 
States chose to prop up Ngo Dinh Diem with billions of dollars of 
military aid despite his lack of popularity and it explains to a large 
degree how the United States, through all its bluster about freedom 
and democracy, could choose to prevent the Vietnamese from 
voting for their own form of government. 
Placing more importance on the prevention of Communism 
than the promotion of democracy gave Dulles and the United States 
an intrinsically negative foreign policy, in which the negation of 
Soviet and Chinese expansion took precedence over the imposition 
of the putative U.S. political values. The Korean War, therefore, led 
Dulles to believe not that the Chinese were exerc1smg the decidedly 
American-flavored right to protect its periphery but that the 
Chinese were spearheading a drive to colonize its Asian neighbors. 
Ironically, Dulles's fears were focused on Japan - which had tried to 
do just that not 20 years before. Dulles was afraid that Chinese 
hegemony would deprive a rebuilding Japan of rice and raw goods 
from Southeast Asia, parts of which (including Vietnam) had been 
self-sufficient in rice until the French took over and began to export 
it. He also feared that U.S. troop deployment in the Far East would 
10 Ibid., p. 447. 
1 1 
be significantly upset if Japan were to go Communist. As a result, 
Dulles was stunned by the Chinese inroads into Korea, where U.S. 
setbacks at the beginning of the war had II grave psychological 
consequences. 11 He resolved to be more bold in the face of 
Communist aggression. The Vietnamese war with the French 
became the crucible in which to test his new resolve.I 1 This was 
the basis upon which the United States moved toward full 
intervention in Vietnam. 
11 Ibid., pp . 466-471 passim. 
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GENEVA 
Almost always it seems our Western 
peoples underestimate the capacity of the Asian 
troops to move surreptitiously through the jungle 
at night, through trails that are impassable to 
white people.12 
The French loss at Dienbienphu in 1954 was also an 
American loss. The United States had poured billions of dollars into 
the French effort since 1950, in effect taking over the financing of 
the war. With the disappointing Korean armistice fresh in their 
minds and McCarthyism in full bloom, the American leaders were 
not willing to accept another setback rn the fight against 
Communism, regardless of the fact that the Communists won m 
Indochina. 
When the participants m the negotiations gathered at Geneva 
m the summer of 1954 (France, the United States, the Soviet Union, 
Great Britain, China, Laos, Cambodia and representatives from both 
the Vietminh and pro-Western element led by playboy emperor 
Bao Dai), their goal was to transform a military confrontation into a 
political solution. Merely scanning the list of participants, however, 
would lead many people to fore see that the outcome of the Geneva 
meetings would not be based upon the needs of Vietnam itself or 
12 John Foster Dulles, May 12, 1954, Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee. Vol. VI. 1954, p. 262. 
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the fact that the Vietminh scored a broad military victory 
throughout Indochina. 
This is what was agreed upon, with the United States and the 
State of Vietnam (Bao Dai's regime) abstaining: 
• an end to the fighting between the Vietnamese and the 
French; 
• the temporary partition of Vietnam at the 17th parallel, 
which would be erased after ... 
• ... nationwide elections m 1956 to reunify the nation under 
one government; 
• neither part of Vietnam could join a military alliance; 
• no new military equipment or personnel were to be brought 
into either area from outside; 
• no foreign military bases; 
• an International Control Commission consisting of 
representatives from Canada, Poland and India was to supervise the 
cease-fire and the preparations for elections. 13 
This proved to be a disaster for the victorious Vietminh. Why 
would Ho agree to regroup north of the 17th parallel, giving up a 
significant amount of land controlled by his forces? Ho was 
justifiably confident that a political solution would favor the 
Vietminh, since all sides agreed that he would win a fair election by 
a wide margin. U.S. intelligence even estimated that Ho would win 
an election with 80 percent of the vote. 14 "As things stand today," 
13 For concise analyses of the Geneva Accords, see Kahin, pp. 52-65, and 
Gibbons, pp. 256-258. 
14 Edward S. Herman and Richard B. DuBoff, America's Vietnam Policy: The 
Strategy of Deception (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press , 1966) , p. 83. 
14 
Dulles told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on July 16, 1954, 
"it is probable that Ho Chi Minh would · get a very large vote. 
Therefore, we are not anx10us to see an early election." l 5 
Eisenhower was convinced. "I have never talked or corresponded 
with a person knowledgeable in Indochinese affairs," he said, "who 
did not agree that had elections been held at the time of the 
fighting, possibly 80 percent of the population would have voted for 
the Communist Ho Chi Minh as their leader rather than Chief of 
State Bao Dai." 16 The U.S. support of Bao Dai, who collaborated with 
the French, was merely one of the first ill-advised efforts to win the 
hearts and minds of the Vietnamese, who had been thirsting for 
freedom from the French for 75 years. Bao Dai was, to the 
Vietnamese, a symbol of the elements of the mandarin class who 
had cooperated with the French throughout the colonial period. It 
was a secret to no one that in a fair election, Bao Dai would be 
crushed. In fact, the State Department, in 1955, admitted that 
maximum conditions of freedom and the 
maximum degree of international supervision 
might well operate to Communist advantage and 
allow considerable Communist strength in the 
South to manifest itself at the polls ... It would 
appear on balance, therefore, seriously 
questionable whether the South should make a 
maJor issue of free political conditions in the 
15 U.S. Senate, Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 
Vol. VI, 83rd Congress, Second Session, 1954, p. 642. 
16 Marvin E. Gettleman, et al (eds.), Vietnam and America (New York, N.Y.: 
Grove Press, 1985), p. 69. The quote is attributed to Dwight D. Eisenhower , 
Mandate for Change (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Books, 1963), p. 372. 
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period preceding and during whatever type of 
elections might finally be decided for Vietnam. I 7 
State Department intelligence experts cited three reasons for 
the Vietminh's strength: their "long identification with the struggle 
for independence, the larger population in the north, and an alleged 
ability to influence elections through "coercion and control. "1 8 
According to the report, furthermore, "the Communists could count 
on at least a substantial vote in their favor in the south, while the 
south could probably expect no more than an insignificant vote in its 
favor in the north." 1 9 
The election provision m the agreement, therefore, was "the 
heart of the Geneva Agreements" for Ho Chi Minh and the 
Vietnamese.20 Two days after the fall of Dienbienphu, the 
Vietminh asked that a date be set for nationwide elections. After 
mne years of war, the Vietminh were ready for peace. Ho Chi Minh 
and the Communist Party leadership in Hanoi had changed their 
policy and goals significantly. They were now intent upon 
establishing peace with the French so the nation could rebuild. Ho 
warned his people against "leftist" and "rightist" tendencies, going 
so far as to allow a small residue of French economic control. He told 
the Sixth Plenum of the Party Central Committee in July 1954 that 
17 Kahin, Intervention, p. 89. 
18 U.S. State Department Intelligence Report No. 6818, "Considerations 
Bearing on the Problem of the 1956 Elections in Vietnam," February 1, 1955, 
p. ii, No. 1978/432A, Declassified Documents Reference System (heretofore 
"DDRS"). 
19 Ibid., p. 12. 
20 Kahin, Intervention, p. 61. 
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the French were no longer the enemy. The enemy was now the 
United States. 
Ho knew that Dulles wanted the United States to intervene 
militarily. 21 Dulles, while at the Geneva negotiations, said he hoped 
the West could hold out in Vietnam until "the coming counterattack 
in two years' time. "22 From the end of 1953 and through the first 
several months of 1954, as the French loss was imminent, Dulles 
had been trying to persuade the Western allies to enter into an 
agreement to back a U.S. military intervention, at least verbally. He 
was also trying to expand a treaty with Australia and New Zealand 
into a regional defense pact against Communism in Asia. Both 
efforts failed. 
Ho was banking on the fact that the French would guarantee 
the Geneva agreements and make sure that the election was held,23 
since the French were aware that failure to do so could result in a 
resumption of hostilities and open rebellion on the part of the 
Vietnamese. Ho was also counting on the Soviets to insure the 
elections. Ho was confident that the election would be carried out. 
"We have won the day at the Geneva conference," he told the 
Vietnamese people.24 Ho was later proved wrong - not about the 
Americans but about the French and the Soviets. He did not know 
the degree to which the Soviet Union and China wanted peace with 
21 Gareth Porter (ed.), Vietnam: The Definitive Documentation of Human 
Decisions, Vol. 1 (Stanfordville, N.Y.: Earl Coleman Enterprises, Inc., 1979), p. 
636. 
22 Lloyd Gardner, Aiwroaching Vietnam: From World War II through 
Dienbienphu, 1941 to 1954 (New York, N.Y.: W.W. Norton & Co., 1988), p. 261. 
23 Porter, Vietnam, p. 670. 
24 Ibid., p. 669. 
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the United States, and overestimated the French commitment to the 
Geneva agreements. 
Indochina, the ostensible subject of the Geneva negotiations, 
was in fact just a stage on which the superpowers were testing their 
wills. All held trumps. France withheld its decision on entering the 
proposed European Defense Community, which would have 
strengthened NATO and rearmed West Germany, to keep in check 
both the United States, which wanted the EDC, and the Soviet Union, 
which did not. 25 The Soviets had little interest in Indochina itself, 
so it was more free to bargain away Vietnamese interests, which it 
eventually did. China also had reason to sell out the Vietnamese. 
Indochina was much more important to the Chinese than to the 
Soviets, since it was so close to home. The Chinese had just fought 
the Americans in Korea and had been threatened with nuclear 
destruction. China did not want U.S. forces next door again, and it 
was willing to make sure that Ho did not demand too much. 26 
So as the Vietminh negotiated a peace settlement after having 
defeated a U.S.-backed French army, they were faced with not only 
the two wartime enemies but two superpower allies that had other 
geopolitical goals besides trying to give the Vietminh the spoils of 
victory. Pinning everything on the election scheduled for 1956, the 
Vietminh accepted the partition of their country and the 
establishment of a "temporary" administration in the South. 
The agreement helped the United States to immediately set 
up a mechanism geared toward making sure South Vietnam would 
25 Kahin, Intervention, p. 55. 
26 Ibid., p. 56. 
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not be a Communist-controlled nation, electorally or otherwise. But 
the United States did not wait for the Geneva agreements to be 
signed, or even for the negotiations to begin. On June 1, 1954, Col. 
Edward G. Lansdale arrived in Saigon to begin a program of 
psychological warfare aimed at subverting Hanoi's administration. 
His tactics included floating rumors about Chinese troops in Tonkin 
raping Vietnamese girls.27 It was an illustration of the early 
commitment the United States had made toward a covert 
subversion of the intent of the Geneva agreements. Lansdale would 
become Diem's right-hand man as the United States feverishly tried 
to create a legitimate government in the South, despite what was 
agreed upon in Geneva and the popularity of the Communists. 
Neither the United States nor Diem's "government" signed the 
Geneva agreements. The National Security Council had concluded 
that the Geneva agreements were a "disaster" and could lead to the 
loss of Southeast Asia.28 The Americans issued an official 
statement taking note of the agreements and mouthing the usual 
platitudes about sovereignty, self-determination and truly free 
elections. Eisenhower and Dulles wanted the elections supervised 
by the United Nations and not the International Control Commission, 
something Britain and France opposed . 
Eisenhower, Dulles and Diem, by the time the ink was dry on 
the Geneva agreements, were already laying the groundwork for 
27 The Pentagon Papers. New York Times edition (New York , N.Y.: Bantam 
Books , 1971), p. 55. 
28 Ibid ., p. 14. 
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imposing a South Vietnamese government outside the guidelines 
established by the accord. 
The separation of Vietnam at the 17th parallel and the 
promise of the election m 1956 went hand in hand for the 
Vietminh, and therefore for the United States as well as Washington 
began its effort to negate the Geneva agreements and the popular 
will of the Vietnamese people. Few Americans cared, or even knew, 
that their government was beginning a process that would 
undermine the democratic process of another country. The years 
1953 and 1954, in fact, may have been the peak of U.S. 
interventionism since World War II. Popular leaders in Guatemala 
and Iran were removed with the help of covert U.S. operations that 
year. Lansdale had just returned from covert work m the 
Philippines, where he helped inspire The Ugly American. 
It was assumed in Washington that the United States was 
responsible for maintaining security throughout the world 
security for the United States, that is. Congress certainly was not a 
source of opposition to Eisenhower's foreign policy, and would not 
act as a check on presidential power until long after American 
troops were committed. Vietnam itself was peripheral to the core of 
the American goal, which was to establish an international front 
against Communism, with Europe as top priority and the rest of the 
world as the barbed wire surrounding the fortress . And the 
sermonizing was not restricted only to John Foster Dulles. The white 
man's burden was still alive, no matter how colonialism was fading. 
20 
Fussell's dichotomy of elementary logic - the totally good versus the 
totally bad - gave birth to rationalizations reminiscent of the 
colonialism of the 1840s. 
Wesley Fishel, a Michigan State academician who collaborated 
with American interventionists in Vietnam, embodied the attitudes 
made possible by this wartime logic. "As one travels through these 
newly born countries," Fishel said as late as 1959, "he comes to 
realize that from the standpoint of the history of thought, the 
people of Southeast Asia are not, generally speaking, sufficiently 
sophisticated enough to understand what we mean by a democracy 
and how they can exercise and protect their own political rights." 2 9 
Cardinal Spellman of New York may have spoken for the United 
States as a whole when he reacted to the Vietnamese struggle 
against colonialism by saying, "Do you peacefully coexist with men 
who thus would train the youth of their godless, Red world?"3 O 
The rhetoric was similar to that of John Foster Dulles, whose 
criticism of Communism often evoked religious themes. Peaceful 
coexistence was never an alternative. The assumption made by 
Spellman, Dulles, Acheson, Eisenhower and all who followed them 
was that Communism by definition was a threat to the United States 
and therefore its existence was intrinsically a provocation. All else 
was secondary. For protection against this threat, the United States 
needed an ally in Vietnam, home to few, if any, pro-Americans who 
29 Marvin E. Gettleman (ed.), Vietnam: History, Documents and Opinions on a 
Major World Crisis (Greenwich, Conn .: Fawcett Publications, 1965), pp. 200-
201, reprinted from The New Leader, "Vietnam's Democratic One-Man Rule," 
Nov. 2, 1959, pp. 10-13. 
30 Marvin E. Gettleman, et al (eds.), Vietnam and America: Documented 
History (New York, N.Y.: Grove Press, 1985), p. 121. 
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had public credibility, given the massive American support to the 
French military. 
Ngo Dinh Diem came to power m Vietnam on July 7, 1954, as 
a pro-American proxy with no popular suppo(t, only a promise of 
U.S. backing and enough materiel to create a security force around 
him. Vietnam, in practically no time, became a crucial player in the 
fight for freedom around the world, as the Americans put it. The 
defeat of the French created a "void" in the world's balance of 
power, according to Dulles, and the question was who was going to 
fill that void: the democrats or the Communists?3 1 Since the 
Americans had already underwritten the French war effort, and 
lost, the answer was pre-determined, and the question was merely 
rhetorical. By October 1955, Diem had taken over as president and 
declared the south to be an independent republic. The extent to 
which the Americans were dependent upon Diem is illustrated by 
their ambivalence toward him. Few, if any, American diplomats 
thought Diem was a worthy leader, despite their public 
proclamations. Dulles, when asked by the French in 1955 to force 
Diem to toe the Western line, said that if Diem was the kind of man 
who would do the American bidding, then he would not be the kind 
of man who could save Vietnam from Communism. 32 It was an 
early example of the sort of paradox that the U.S. goals in Vietnam 
engendered, a political corollary to what would later escalate into 
burning villages in order to save them. The paradox was that the 
31 Gibbons, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War. p. 179. 
32 U.S. State Department, Foreign Relations of the United States: Vietnam, 
1955-1957. Vol. I (Washington, D.C.: U.S . Government Printing Office), p. 416. 
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United States needed an independent-minded proxy, a blocked 
election, and, later, destruction to preserve "democracy." The 
means the United States needed to achieve its end made the end 
impossible. 
The United States had little time to find a better ally than 
Diem in South Vietnam. As the 1956 date for the election neared, 
U.S. "prestige" and "responsibility" became increasingly at risk. By 
1956, Senator John F. Kennedy was calling Vietnam "the 
cornerstone of the Free World in Southeast Asia." 
"The fundamental tenets of this nation's foreign policy, in 
short, depend in considerable measure upon a strong and free 
Vietnamese nation," Kennedy said. " ... The United States is directly 
responsible for this experiment. It is playing an important role m 
the laboratory where it is being conducted. We cannot afford to 
permit that experiment to fail. ... If we are not the parents of little 
Vietnam, then surely we are the godparents. We presided at its 
birth, we gave assistance to its life, we have helped to shape its 
future. This is our offspring. . .. " He went on to urge that the 
United States "never" approve the election stipulated by the Geneva 
Declaration .3 3 
33 Gibbons, pp. 303-305. 
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THE ELECTION IS SUBVERTED 
Was it conceivable that the great powers 
would allow Vietnamese elections to determine 
the issue of war and peace? Better to leave such 
questions unasked - you might get a truthful 
answer.3 4 
Communications among U.S. officials during 1954-1956 
concerning the planned Vietnam election represented an eerie 
overture to the kind of thinking and action that characterized 
American military involvement rn Vietnam 10 years later. 
Indecision and a lack of experience in dealing with a new situation 
retarded the formation of U.S. policy during that period toward 
Vietnam and the scheduled election. America had designated itself 
the sentinel of freedom for the world, had equated freedom with 
the absence of Communism, and was now faced with an election m 
which everyone conceded that the Communists would wm. 
As a result, U.S. Cold War policy toward Vietnam after the 
Geneva agreements was similar in character to its policy during the 
shooting war 10 years later: it was a policy of tactics without any 
strategy . Without sufficient political leverage, the United States 
answered a political problem with a military solution. In 1965, it 
was the introduction of ground troops; in 1955, it was the threat of 
invasion. It was a subtle threat - the influx of several hundred 
34 Gardner, Approaching Vietnam, p. 284. 
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military personnel - but it was enough to plant the idea m the 
minds of the war-weary Vietminh. 
At the same time, Eisenhower and Dulles tried to find a way 
to delay the election to buy enough time to prop up Diem, whose 
power base was nearly nonexistent. The solution for them was to 
create a catch-22 for the Vietminh. According to this setup, the 
election could be held as long as the United States and Diem were 
convinced that they would be held freely. This course had been set 
before the Geneva agreements had been signed. "We believe, the 
French believe, that by stipulating for election conditions and this 
supervisory machinery and agreement by both regimes that the 
conditions are ready for elections, that election can be postponed 
until conditions are more favorable for them, and if by that time 
conditions are more favorable to them, then probably the other side 
won't want to have elections," Dulles told the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee in July 1954.35 In essence, the United States, 
with few cards in its hand, could hope to win only by upping the 
ante so far that the Communists could not continue the game. The 
message from Diem and the United States was that they supported 
the election but that the Communists would have to prove that it 
would be executed to the West's satisfaction. This abrogation of the 
Geneva agreements came from two parties that refused to sign 
them. 
What the United States and Diem ostensibly wanted, according 
to this stance, was freedom of speech, free campaigns, and free 
35 U.S. Senate, Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
Vol. VI, 83rd Congress, Second Session, 1954, pp. 642-643. 
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assemblies before the election. Privately, they hoped it would . be 
too much for the Vietminh to accept. They also knew that those 
conditions would actually help the Vietminh win an election. This 
was documented m a secret State Department intelligence report 
drafted in February 1955: 
"It is not apparent that the establishment of conditions of 
electoral freedom is actually of vital importance to the non-
Communists in Vietnam," the report stated. "As a matter of fact, 
such conditions might operate to favor the Communists more than 
their opponents. "36 The report then went on to say, after stating 
that the Communists would not need to rig an election, that "it is 
inconceivable that anything but a nearly completely rigged election 
could occur in the north. "37 The State Department analysts then 
made it clear that, despite the demands to be made of the Vietminh 
regarding a "free" election, the United States did not consider the 
democratic process to fit its needs: "In the south ... maximum 
conditions of freedom and a maximum degree of international 
supervision might well operate to Communist advantage and allow 
the considerable Communist strength in the south to manifest itself 
at the polls, where otherwise, with the proper electoral 
arrangements and a minimum of Communist pre-electoral 
campaigning, such strength might be kept away. It would appear on 
balance, therefore, seriously questionable whether the south should 
make a maJor issue of free political conditions in the period 
3 6 U.S. State Department Intelligence Report No. 6818, "Considerations 
Bearing on the Problem of the 1956 Elections in Vietnam," February 1, 1955, 
p. 9, No. 1978/432A, DDRS. 
37 Ibid. 
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preceding and during whatever type of elections may finally be 
decided for Vietnam." (Emphasis added.)38 Evidently, not only did 
the United States not want democratic elections, it also was 
considering making the "proper electoral arrangements" to dilute 
Communist strength. 
The contradictions within U.S. policy did not disappear over 
the next few months as the July 1955 date for election consultations 
approached. The period between February and July 1955 was when 
the bulk of U.S. planning was done regarding the election. During 
those six months, Dulles and his subordinates wrestled with the 
problem while furiously trying to solidify Diem's reign. Since this 
study is primarily an examination of the thinking behind U.S. policy 
during the period, the evolution of that policy and the process by 
which it was formed deserves a detailed account. 
The communication among U.S. diplomats during this period 
reveals no "smoking gun" that places responsibility for the 
cancellation of the election squarely on American shoulders. But 
taken as a whole, it becomes clear that the United States had no 
intention of abiding by the election provision. The most damning 
evidence is a telegram from John Foster Dulles to the embassy m 
Saigon on April 6, 1955. In it, Dulles explains his position to 
embassy officials as preparation for a round of talks scheduled with 
the British and the French. The policy is based upon a proposal put 
forth by Anthony Eden for the planned all-German elections; that 
38 Ibid. 
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proposal was rejected by the Communists, and Dulles hoped to 
match Eden's success. 
The basic principle is that Free Viet-Nam 
will insist to the Viet Minh that unless agreement 
is first reached by the latter's acceptance of the 
safeguards spelled out, that no repeat no further 
discussions are possible regarding the type of 
elections, the issues to be voted on or any other 
factors. After we have Diem's general acceptance 
we can proceed inform UK and France of this plan, 
which we think [is the] only formula which 
ensures both satisfactory response to [the] Geneva 
Agreement and at [the] same time [a] plan which 
is unassailable 1n intent but probably 
unacceptable to Communists because of 
prov1s1ons for strict compliance to ensure 
genuinely free elections.39 
Dulles went on to tell the embassy officials that they should 
not show Diem the details of their plan but should speak to him 
privately, to secure his approval but to make sure he "accepts it to 
[the] degree we can proceed with [the] French [and] British on [the] 
broad assumption [that] Free Viet-Nam's position [is] similar [to] our 
own. "4 0 Dulles told the embassy to remind Diem that similar 
proposals were used in Germany and Korea, and that in each case 
the Communists refused to comply with the restrictions. 
With this edict from Dulles, and with Eisenhower's blessing, 
U.S. policy was in place. The wording of Dulles's telegram is open to 
interpretation, however. By itself, it does not prove that the United 
States took the initiative to subvert the election. It can be 
39 Porter, Vietnam, p. 694. 
40 Ibid. 
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interpreted as a benign acquiescence to Diem's desire to avoid the 
election. But Dulles's telegram leaves ample space for a different 
interpretation. The fact of the matter was that everyone, including 
the Americans, knew that Diem had little support in South Vietnam 
(the Americans were already thinking about replacing him), so it 
was quite obvious that Diem was against the election and would do 
what he could to avoid it, since he was sure to lose. All he needed 
was a reason to subvert it, and that reason could come only from 
the party that held the power in South Vietnam: the United States. 
The election could not have been subverted without U.S. support 
and complicity. Whether Diem or the United States took the 
initative, therefore, is a moot point. The responsibility was always 
with the United States, whether it did nothing to subvert the 
election or took action. Dulles's telegram was that action. His 
concern about selling the idea to Diem was unnecessary. From that 
point on, Diem had the support he needed to avoid the election and 
create a power base. 
Five days later, Dulles left no doubt about who actually held 
the power m South Vietnam. In a cable to General J. Lawton Collins, 
the special U.S. representative to South Vietnam, Dulles gave 
perm1ss10n to "acquiesce in plans for (Diem's) replacement. "4 1 
Collins had been sent to Vietnam in November 1954 as a temporary 
envoy with the rank of ambassador. Collins's military expertise was 
beyond question, but he knew little about Vietnam. His primary 
goal was to establish military security there, not political stability. 
41 U.S. State Department Draft Cable, "Eyes Only for Collins from Secretary," 
April 11, 1955, p. 1, No. 1984/2941, DDRS. 
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To his credit, he quickly recognized Diem's shortcomings. He also 
was one of the first - and one of the last for a long time - to 
consider withdrawal from Vietnam as a realistic solution to the 
already deepening political quagmue in which Eisenhower and 
Dulles found themselves. Unfortunately, he also thought the 
playboy emperor Bao Dai, who had even less support than Diem 
among the populace, was a possible alternative. A third alternative 
offered by Collins was to continue support of Diem, and that is what 
was chosen after U.S. officials realized that other pro-American 
Vietnamese had as little credibility in Vietnam as Diem . 
. Dulles, though he professed to be well aware of Diem's 
shortcomings, decided that full commitment to his regime was 
better than withdrawal. That meant the beginning of a massive 
economic and military effort to stabilize Diem's control and 
establish military security in South Vietnam, which was full of 
Vietminh sympathizers and dissident sects prone to violence. At the 
same time the United States and Diem were building Vietnamese 
armed forces and quelling disturbances, they had to walk a political 
tightrope. Their problem was that the Geneva agreements called for 
a temporary regrouping in the north and the south, not separate 
nations, and for a reunification in 1956 after the election. Diem and 
the United States, neither of whom had any intention of complying 
with the agreements, nevertheless had to create the illusion that 
the goals set forth in Geneva were their goals, too. 
From Dulles's order in April 1955, to get Diem to agree to put 
off the election, until July 1956, when the election was scheduled to 
be held, U.S. policy was driven by a desire only to keep Diem m 
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power and to stave off any Communist inroads into the south. In 
May 1955, nearly a year after Geneva, the National Security Council 
drafted a policy on the election. It was a policy based upon a 
military relationship, not only a political one, and its goal was 
inherently negative: to prevent Communist gain. The goals, as 
outlined, were to "maintain a friendly non-Communist Free 
Vietnam; to assist Free Vietnam to maintain (a) military forces 
necessary for internal security, and (b) economic conditions 
conducive to the maintenance of the strength of the non-Communist 
regime; and to prevent a Communist victory through all-Vietnam 
elections. "42 The NSC said Diem had to be able to maintain order, 
put down insurrections, and win an election in the south before he 
could "give lip service to the idea of national unification through 
elections, or to insist on adequate conditions for free elections. "4 3 
The NSC suggested that Diem go ahead with consultations for the 
election, which was scheduled for July 1955. The United States, in 
the meantime, would provide information and advice about 
Communist "positions and tactics" in Greece, Germany, Austria, and 
Korea. It would also help Diem lay the blame for failing to secure 
the election on the Communists. The NSC then outlined what Diem's 
demands should be regarding "adequate guarantees" of the freedom · 
of the election. They included: " safeguards to assure conditions of 
genuine freedom before, after, and during elections; full powers for 
any Supervisory Commission to act to ensure free elections and to 
guarantee against prior coercion or subsequent reprisal; adequate 
42 PRUS, 1955-1957. Vol. I, p . 411. 
43 Ibid. 
3 1 
guarantees for, among other things, freedom of movement, freedom 
of presentation of candidates, immunity of candidates, freedom 
from arbitrary arrest or victimization, freedom of association and 
political meetings, freedom of expression for all, freedom of press, 
radio, and free circulation of newspapers, secrecy of vote, security 
of polling stations and ballot boxes. The Communists would find it 
most difficult to accept such conditions or to allow their 
implementation if accepted. "44 
In Vietnam in 1955, these conditions were crucial to the U.S. 
effort to postpone the election. Because of the American pretense 
about exporting democracy, U.S. officials did not want to appear to 
be avoiding the election. This was especially significant because the 
Vietminh had already gained credence in Vietnam for leading the 
fight to overthrow the colonialist regime. If Diem were to seem as if 
he were trying to avoid the election, his effort to build an 
indigenous following at the expense of the Communists would be 
doomed. The presence of French troops in Vietnam after Geneva did 
not help Diem. The French were afraid that a cancellation of the 
election would spark another outbreak of war. And since France 
signed the Geneva agreements, unlike Diem and the United States, 
potential hostilities caused by a cancelation loomed larger in their 
view. The prospect of renewed hostilities was not lost upon U.S. 
officials. They were well aware that their attempt to subvert the 
election could touch off another shooting war. U.S. involvement in 
such a war was already justified, however: international support 
44 Ibid., p. 412. 
32 
could be forthcoming, according to the NSC, "... on the grounds of a 
Vietminh repudiation of the Geneva Agreements and resort to force 
in an unwillingness to accept conditions guaranteeing the freedom 
of elections "45 
From this point, the United States had two challenges: first, to 
convince Diem that its strategy for the election was the right one, 
and second, to bolster Diem's regime enough so it could withstand 
political and military encroachment from the north. The first 
proved to be no challenge at all. The second lasted 20 more years 
and failed. 
Diem, a Westernized Catholic in an Eastern nation of Buddhists 
and Confucian tradition, had little power base without U.S. 
assistance. He had no reason to go through with the election and 
maintained throughout that he was not bound by the Geneva 
agreements since he did not sign them. Of course, neither Diem nor 
the United States ever mentioned that Diem played no role in 
bringing France to the table to end the war. He was a tool by which 
the United States could bypass the Geneva agreements and set up a 
separate nation in the south, and because it was the only way he 
could achieve power in his home country, he was more than willing 
to deal with the Americans for as long as it was necessary . Diem, 
however , was well aware that he was not powerless. Once it became 
clear that the reunification would not take place and that the South 
would remain separate, Diem would demonstrate a shrewd 
45 Ibid., p. 410. 
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understanding of how the United States was as dependent on him 
as he was dependent on it. 
Diem, in fact, had already decided to resist the election, smce 
it would result in his fall from power. But in 1955, with his grip on 
power in the south still tenuous, he needed a green light from the 
United States, and when he got it, his opposition to the election, and 
even the consultations scheduled for the summer of 1955, became 
more vocal. Diem and Dulles now focused their attention on 
convincing the rest of the world that their refusal to go through 
with the election was justified. Diem was adamant about canceling 
the consultations. Dulles saw them as a good way to demonstrate 
good faith. The French, who still had troops in Vietnam and were 
more fearful than the Americans of renewed warfare, wanted the 
consultations to begin before the July 20 deadline so the Vietminh 
would not have an excuse to resume the war.46 For Dulles, the 
consultations would be an opportunity to state what conditions 
would be needed before the election could be held. "Basically, we 
believe that in order to put Free Vietnam in (the) strongest position 
it should take initiative on free elections and insist on rigid 
guarantees by (the) Communists for genuinely free elections," Dulles 
said in a cable to the Saigon embassy. "Our experience in Germany 
and Korea has been that such guarantees are unacceptable to the 
Communists and that as a result negotiations have either broken 
down or been extended, in the case of Germany over ten years. "4 7 
Dulles told embassy officials to remind Diem of the "seriously 
46 Ibid., p. 420. 
47 Ibid., p. 422. 
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complicating disadvantages" of flatly rejecting the consultations . He 
was concerned enough to dispatch a State Department official to 
Saigon for 60 days to help the embassy with smoothing over the 
election issue. Diem was not as concerned about world opinion as 
Dulles, who had repeatedly expressed a desire to present Vietnam 
to the world as an example of American benevolence. 
At the same time, Dulles revised the policy on elections to 
take better advantage of the leverage from demanding specific 
conditions for the election. "It 1s important that the Free 
Vietnamese Government be in a position to make political capital 
from strong advocacy of unification through genuinely free 
elections," Dulles cabled the embassy on May 27. 
It is also important that the Communists clearly 
bear the onus for any refusal to agree to conditions 
which would guarantee genuinely free elections or for 
any obstruction of the preliminary talks. If the 
International Supervisory Commission [a provision of 
the Geneva agreements] is active in the discussions its 
activity might tend to diffuse the political advantages 
which Free Vietnam might otherwise gain from the 
negotiations and at the same time provide the 
Communists with the means for avoiding full 
responsibility for any negative attitudes which they 
may adopt. The United States believes that it would be 
unwise to entrust any important part of the task of 
devising the conditions or objectives of elections in 
Vietnam to a commission composed of members 
having such conflicting views. The United States would 
not expect Free Vietnam to be willing to delegate 
authority to such a commission. 4 8 [The comm1ss10n 
comprised representatives from Canada, Poland and 
India.] 
48 Ibid., pp. 422-423 . 
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At this point, the United States was trying to subvert the 
entire Geneva agreements - the election, the reunification, even the 
benign, virtually powerless International Control Commission. But 
Dulles was not through. He went on to tell Saigon that no election 
should take place until the country had a constitution first. In the 
meantime, he said, Vietnam should remain separated. For Dulles, it 
made sense, because at the same time he was devising a strategy to 
bypass the election, he was also trying to build an army around 
Diem. In fact, in May 1955, two months before the election 
consultations were to begin, the United States was already planning 
Diem's military needs through 1958 - two and a half years after the 
election was to take place. Geneva's whole point was to turn a 
military situation - the Franco-Vietnamese war - into a political 
solution: reunification through free elections. The United States, 
while calling for election consultations, was already turning that 
goal on its head and was confident enough of its prospects that 
militarization was planned three years down the road. The obvious 
connection was that the United States could not achieve its political 
goal - the establishment of a Western-controlled outpost m Vietnam 
- without military means. In May 1955, the political atmosphere 
still heavily favoring the Vietminh, the need for military buildup 
was all the more crucial to empowering Diem. In a letter to the 
Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs, Randolph Kidder, 
the Saigon embassy counselor, said the South Vietnamese army 
would have to be enlarged because of "the continuing state of 
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insecurity. "49 But there was a problem: The number of available 
men was unknown, so conscription would be difficult. There was a 
convenient solution, however: A census was about to be taken for 
the election. 
A year earlier, Ho's deputy, Pham Van Dong, had said the 
Americans "fear peace. "50 The effort in 1955 to not only drag out 
the demobilization process but plan for a South Vietnamese military 
buildup supported his view. The United States based its desire for a 
larger army on a clear analysis of Diem's situation: an "absence of 
political, administrative and military backing throughout the 
countryside. Until the national government establishes its authority 
with officials and security forces at the provincial and village level, 
Free Viet-Nam 1s more an express10n of desire than the 
establishment of fact. "5 1 With this prescient analysis, U.S. officials, 
as they would for the next 20 years, used valid data as the basis for 
insupportable action. Instead of concluding that Diem could not 
achieve significant backing despite U.S. support, they concluded that 
more military assistance was needed. The solution: more aircraft, 
ammunition and "possibly military advice. This may be a radical 
suggestion but once on a course I like to see it carried through," said 
Kenneth Young, director of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs. 5 2 
This course of logic, indeed, was carried through. 
49 I.hid.., p . 424 . 
50 Porter, Vietnam, p. 572. 
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At this point, Diem and the United States had a problem of 
their own to consider. With the July 20 consultations still almost 
two months away, they could not yet make their election demands 
public. It would be obvious that it was a ploy to avoid the 
consultations and the election itself. Therefore, they could not yet 
pretend to adhere to high democratic standards in order to bypass 
the election. In the meantime, they had to show the world that they 
were establishing a free nation while at the same time increasing 
security behind an unpopular leader. It is important to remember 
that world opinion and U.S. prestige were at the root of the 
American effort in Vietnam. This was not one of Washington's 
covert coups. The United States had placed Vietnam in its showcase 
and it needed a public relations victory to establish itself as a 
supporter of independence in the Third World. Trying to silently 
install a friendly puppet was not enough. If Vietnam was to be 
made an example, by definition it had to be on the world stage. 
Unfortunately, the political conditions in Vietnam during the 1950s 
were not conducive to such an effort. Creating a regime m South 
Vietnam was made more difficult with others watching. 
As the deadline for consultations neared, it became apparent 
to U.S. officials that avoiding an unwinnable election was not a 
simple task. Because of the lack of support for Diem and the 
Vietminh's popularity, the Vietminh enjoyed the upper hand as long 
as the consultations were yet unheld. Crawling out from under this 
relationship could not be solved militarily in six weeks. Diem's 
regime could not be made secure in that time, and even if it could it 
would not change the fact that negotiations between the Vietminh 
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and Diem, especially with French Expeditionary Forces still in the 
country, would be a public disaster. This was not lost on Young, who 
wrote to the new ambassador in Saigon, Frederick Reinhardt: 
... We are running into stormy weather. The 
Vietnamese may become more and more allergic 
to talking with the Viet Minh m July or 
thereafter. They may fear this ipso facto 
acceptance of the Genva Accord and of the Viet 
Minh. We foresee a lot of trouble here if the 
Vietnamese are stubborn in the Korean fashion. I 
personally have a lot of sympathy for their 
position and hope we will not twist their arm to 
talk with the Communists. On the other hand their 
refusal will become an international issue which 
might be most untimely this summer whether at 
the summit, on the slopes or particularly down in 
the foothills. A policy of discretion is probably 
better than an attitude of outright defiance but 
we may have some real diplomatic problems 
here.5 3 
Young went on to tell Reinhardt that they might have to make 
Diem understand that any Vietminh retaliation for subverting the 
election could end U.S. assistance.5 4 
On June 8, Dulles was informed that Diem had three maJor 
reasons for refusing to participate in consultations: First, he wanted 
to dissociate himself from the Geneva election provision; second, a 
National Assembly would have to be elected and consulted before 
he could consider participating; and third, the status of the French 
53 l.b.lil., pp. 428-429. 
54 Young went on to say that his office received a "mountain" of telegrams 
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forces would have to be reconsidered so that he and his army could 
enjoy complete sovereignty. Diem's reluctance represented one of 
his first tests of American resolve, and the answer he got helped set 
a precedent. Instead of ordering Diem to participate in the 
consultations or risk loss of the only support he had, U.S. officials 
gave him what he wanted. Dulles and five other State Department 
officials met later on June 8 to discuss the election and decided that 
all three of Diem's concerns were justified. They went a big step 
further: They decided that if the Vietminh resumed shooting after 
the consultations were canceled, the United States would be 
justified in taking military action in support of Diem even if its 
Manila Pact allies refused to help. But they wavered on whether 
they would actually do it if the occasion arose. A memorandum of 
conversation from the meeting illuminates Dulles's thinking on the 
matter and illustrates the indecision in dealing with the problem: 
Our pos1t10n in effect was that we were telling 
Diem to do everything possible to frustrate the holding 
of elections by insisting on conditions which the 
Communists could not possibly accept, and then if the 
Communists attack we would indicate to Diem in 
advance that we would intervene on his side. This did 
not seem to be altogether a sound position, particularly 
if Diem had some different views .... If Diem does not 
conform to the provisions of the Geneva Accords and if 
the Viet Minh invades Free Viet-Nam, would we or 
would we not consider the Viet Minh action a breach of 
the accords and would come to Diem's aid or not by 
invoking the Manila Pact? If Diem does conform fully to 
the provisions of the Geneva Accords, consults with the 
Viet Minh, takes the desired position on the genuinely 
free elections and then the Viet Minh are so frustrated 
that they invade with force, we apparently would then 
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consider that a breach of the Geneva Accords, and 
invoke the Manila Pact. The question was left for 
further consideration. . .. 5 5 
The next day, the National Security Council postponed 
consideration of NSC 5519, the policy on Vietnam elections. Dulles 
wanted to learn more about Diem's feelings, and those of the British 
and the French. It was a year after Geneva and less than six weeks 
from the deadline for consultations. 
The dilemma, if not the solution, was becoming clearer to U.S. 
officials the closer their backs came to the wall: either force Diem to 
negotiate, or go along with him and risk war. U.S. officials were 
clear in their analysis of what could happen if the Vietminh were 
angered. However, there is no evidence that they thought through 
the possible ramifications of angering Diem. Evidently, this was 
unthinkable. Losing their only hope in Vietnam was much worse 
than the prospect of war. Diem's refusal to talk to the Vietminh, as a 
result, became more and more attractive. The only thing left to do 
for the Americans was to convince themselves. The optimism 
expressed by one U.S. diplomat was limitless: " ... Diem may be in a 
strong position nationally and internationally," Young wrote 
Reinhardt. 
He 1s trying to save people from 
Communism. He does not want to be forced into 
complying with a document he rejected and has 
never recognized. He does not want to assume 
the position of a dictator engaging in profoundly 
important talks with the enemy before there is 
55 FRUS. 1955-1957. Vol. I, p. 440. 
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some democratic expression in the South g1vmg 
him a valid and legal mandate. He is not going to 
be forced into this by the French. On the other 
hand the Viet Minh in the eyes of the 
Vietnamese are forcing the Geneva Accords on 
the country and are working closely with the 
French to do this. In the United States, and I 
suspect many other countries, there will be great 
sympathy and support for Diem and the 
Nationalists. 5 6 
Now that it was obvious that Diem would not only refuse to 
allow the election but skip the consultations as well, the United 
States could unload the onus for the breach of Geneva onto the 
Vietnamese. One Dulles aide suggesting leaving the entire matter up 
the Vietnamese while calling for a National Assembly to support 
Diem. "This position would be strictly in keeping with the 
fundamental doctrine of 'consent of the governed,' the aide told 
Dulles. "The U.S. cannot be a party to political acts or decisions 
which do not reflect the will of the people validly ascertained and 
expressed. "57 This rhetorical adherence to democratic principles 
was also shared by The New Yark Times at the time, which said the 
United States should give Vietnam more opportunities to 
"understand" democracy. The Vietnamese, the Times said, should 
be given "the tools they need to build their own democracy. "5 8 
One of those tools, apparently, was a good propaganda 
campaign. The goal, ostensibly, was to garner widespread American 
and Vietnamese support for Diem's refusal to go ahead with the 
56 Ibid., p. 445. 
57 J..hl.d,, p. 450. 
58 The New York Times, May 20, 1955, p. 6. 
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Geneva election prov1s10ns. The actual goal was to garner enough 
public support for Diem's position to make it appear that it was 
shared by many Vietnamese. In Vietnam it was impossible to 
quantify widespread support, but the United States had no 
intention of doing so, anyway . It had already conceded privately 
that Ho would win an election by a significant margin. The State 
Department urged Diem to take strong public stands in favor of the 
concept of elections, make use of the list of American electoral 
conditions, and move forward with the establishment of a National 
Assembly to reinforce his rule. The State Department called Diem's 
position "logically and morally correct," at least within its own 
channels of communication, while at the same time admitting that a 
subversion of the Geneva electoral provisions would anger the 
British, French and ICC representatives. It admitted that the 
military risks were quite real, and that world opinion, which Dulles 
courted, could turn against the United States. But it concluded that 
the adoption of Diem's stance toward the election would favor the 
West. American diplomats reasoned that China and the Soviet Union 
were exerting pressure on the Vietminh against resummg 
hostilities; that the Vietminh were militarily weak in the south; and 
that support for Diem could increase in Vietnam. Thus, the U.S. 
position not only flew in the face of democratic principle, world and 
Allied opinion, and basic reasoning, but it relied heavily not on 
concrete evidence but on hope. "... [H]is courageous resistance to 
Viet Minh blandishments and threats may well make him 
43 
increasingly popular and hence strong. "59 They were referring to a 
country in which even President Eisenhower admitted that most of 
the population backed the Vietminh. Diem, however, would later be 
elected president with 98 percent of the vote in a Stalin-style 
election which U.S. officials praised for its fairness. 
The Americans were not totally ignorant of the lack of 
support for Diem in Vietnam. In fact, some U.S. officials based m 
Vietnam may have had a better handle on what the Vietnamese 
people wanted than Diem. If there was one overriding concern 
among the people, it was land reform. This was especially true in 
the south, where the bulk of the French colonial economic system 
was based. The French rice and rubber operations had taken over 
huge tracts of land in the South and transformed the area from an 
self-supporting agranan society into a market-based export 
economy in which rice was sent out of the country and many 
Vietnamese would eventually starve. Diem, a Catholic who was 
educated in France and who wore the white suits made popular in 
colonial times, cared little about the land issue. He cared even less 
than the Americans, who at the same time were supporting the 
same kind of colonialist economic and social upheavals wrought by 
the United Fruit Co. in Central and South America. So the Americans' 
complaint about Diem's lack of sensibility regarding land reform 
was a clear indicator of why Diem lacked popular support. The 
Vietminh had been using the land issue for years to gain support in 
59 FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. I, p. 453. 
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the country, and it was a major reason for their popularity as the 
United States tried to establish Diem's rule in 1955. 
In June 1955, the U.S. land reform adviser to Diem, Wolf 
Ladejinsky, complained to Ambassador Reinhardt that Diem was not 
sufficiently concerned about the matter, and that Diem's lack of 
sympathy for the landless peasants in the south was spilling over to 
the fledgling government. There was, Ladejinsky said, a "political 
and administrative vacuum in the countryside." Diem's support 
structure was weak, he said. "... [T]he real difficulty with the 
administrators is not their lack of formal public administration 
training, but rather the lassitude, disinterestedness and seeming 
failure to sense or comprehend the critical transition period 
Vietnam is passing through." He went on to talk about a province 
chief assigned to an important area in the south as being anti-Diem. 
Ladejinsky suggested to Diem that his government try to establish a 
better relationship with the farmers to show them that he 
appreciated their fundamental needs, i.e., land. "But now, as m the 
past," Ladejinsky reported, "the President pleaded extreme pre-
occupation with urgent matters. "60 This early attempt at winning 
the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese was not followed through. 
The United States government, which was beginning to realize that 
no alternative to Diem was readily available, was more and more 
dependent on him and could not pressure him, even if it wanted to. 
60 lb.id..., pp. 457-458. For an analysis of Diem's handling of the land reform 
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Diem's "urgent matters" concerned security - specifically some 
uprisings by several sects, which Diem suppressed. 
With the scheduled consultations now less than a month 
away, the United States and Diem were no closer to resolving their 
public relations problem than when the Geneva talks ended a year 
earlier. Instead of going through with the consultations, as the U.S. 
officials had hoped, Diem was adamant about rejecting them. 
Pressure from outside the Washington-Saigon axis was beginning to 
build. The British and French wanted to hold to Geneva, and the 
press was beginning to show some interest m the issue. On June 28, 
1955, Dulles uttered what may have been the first outright lies 
from Washington about Vietnam. At a news conference, Dulles told 
reporters that the balking over the election was the result of 
concerns over the conditions and not because Diem and the United 
States were afraid they would lose. "... There is no serious risk that 
the Communists would win," Dulles said. "... [W]e are not afraid at all 
of elections. "61 
On July 5, Ambassador Reinhardt was shown a draft 
declaration by Diem stating his position on the consultations. Diem 
intended to read the statement to the Vietnamese via the radio. 
According to Reinhardt, four-fifths of the statement consisted of 
reasons Diem was not bound by the Geneva agreements, plus a 
statement that his government believed in unification and elections 
as long as they were free. Reinhardt thought the declaration too 
61 Porter, Vietnam, p. 705. 
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negative, that it would "make a poor impression abroad." He 
suggested that Diem also state that he planned to hold elections for 
a representative assembly in the South. Neither the British nor the 
French were happy with the statement, either. The French, 
according to Reinhardt, were worried about losing face.6 2 Diem, 
according to Reinhardt, seemed to be in no hurry to resolve his 
political problems. 
Young, for one, was becoming concerned about the situation in 
Vietnam. It was becoming a crisis, he told Walter Robertson, 
assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern Affairs. "The question of 
the Vietnamese elections is beginning to boil over," he wrote. "The 
Viet Minh 1s threatening retaliation. Diem is defiant, and with much 
reason. If the Vietnamese Government has not responded in any 
way to some form of consultations beginning on or after July 20, I 
think you should be prepared for a senous diplomatic problem." 6 3 
Young feared a power play by the Soviet Union at an upcommg 
summit meeting. Specifically, he was afraid the Soviets would push 
to reconvene the Geneva principals to bring Diem and the Vietminh 
together to arrange the election. He also feared that the Soviets 
would bring up U.S. involvement in Cambodia and Laos. "If the 
Russians press for some action on the Vietnamese elections 
question," Young wrote, "it may be difficult for the French and the 
British to resist. "64 Young then provided a succinct summary of the 
American involvement in Vietnam at that point: "Meanwhile there 
62 FRUS. 1955-1957. Vol. I, p. 476. 
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1s nothing but drift, indecision and confusion on our side," he wrote 
Robertson. "The Vietnamese are completely negative and may 
create an impasse. The British are worried and want something 
done. The Viet Minh and the Vietnamese will not talk to each other. 
It is a messy situation. "65 
Young was worried about the public relations involved. The 
Communists were now making adherence to Geneva part of their 
party line. Ho was about to embark on a trip to Moscow and Beijing. 
Diem would not come out of it looking very good. Young urged that 
American officials continue to bolster Diem "to offset the world 
press" Ho would get from his trip. Faced with this impending 
"crisis," Dulles responded on July 6 in two ways: by sending the 
Saigon embassy his position on the cost of military assistance for 
the calendar year 1956, and by sending Diem a letter congratulating 
him on his first year in office. "... It is indeed gratifying that the 
people and Government of Free Viet-Nam have made such strides 
in consolidating their independence and in advancing the national 
reconstruction of the country," Dulles wrote . "All those from the 
North and the South who seek true freedom for the individual 
deserve the tribute of free men everywhere. "66 
If Diem sought freedom for his people, it was a cunous sort of 
freedom - one lacking in self-determination. With the scheduled 
consultations only a week away, Diem apparently was more worried 
about military concerns. Diem wanted military sovereignty, 
Reinhardt told the State Department, and that meant transferring 
65 !Jrul. 
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the High Command from the French, who still held it, to the 
Vietnamese. The French presence in Vietnam was a continuous 
source of political gain for the Vietminh, who based their long fight 
for independence upon self-determination and the expulsion of the 
French colonialists. Now Diem wanted military sovereignty m the 
South, but it was not because he shared the Vietminh desires, as did 
80 percent of the country. Diem wanted control, but he also wanted 
the French to keep their air force and navy in Vietnam. Diem knew 
that he could not maintain power without military assistance. But 
he was hopelessly preoccupied with short-term security concerns. 
Instead of eliminating the source of his unpopularity - his 
dependence on the Americans and the French - he chose to increase 
his dependence to build a shield around himself, all the while 
increasing his unpopularity. (Later, after the election deadline 
passed, he began to terrorize suspected Vietminh sympathizers, 
helping to give birth to the National Liberation Front and then open 
warfare.) In July 1955, with political entanglements unresolved, 
Diem and his U.S. supporters were already using military solutions 
to deal with nonmilitary problems. Early in July, protesters in 
Saigon demonstrated in favor of holding the election. They were 
arrested immediately. Two weeks later, The New York Times called 
Diem a "dedicated democrat of scrupulous honesty."67 
If Dulles was in fact unafraid of the election, he did not show 
it. On July 15, he told the Saigon embassy that the United States 
would simply avoid discussing Indochina with the Soviets at the 
67 The New York Times, July 17, 1955, Section IV, p. 2. 
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summit. If the Soviets propose a five-power conference on 
Indochina, or a reconvening of the Geneva participants, the United 
States would oppose it, Dulles said. If the Soviets press the issue, he 
said, the United States would take the position that any discussions 
would have to be between the Vietnamese . Dulles asked Reinhardt 
to ask Diem to issue his declaration on the consultations before July 
18. It would help in "heading [the] Russians off," Dulles said. 6 8 
Diem, in fact, had revised his draft declaration, and was prepared to 
go on the air with it the next day, July 16. In it, Diem stated his 
commitment to reunification, then used the Americans' weapon: He 
wanted elections, but only if they were free. Then he took it one 
step further. Not only would the North have the burden of proving 
that the elections would be free, but the Vietminh would have to 
renounce terrorism and totalitarianism. 
On July 19, Pham Van Dong said the North Vietnamese were 
ready to hold the consultations , and asked that they begin . No 
immediate response came from Diem. The July 20 deadline came 
and went quietly, but the issue remained. For the French, it was 
more of a problem than ever. They had signed the Geneva 
agreements and were committed to bringing about the election, but 
the power was with Diem and the United States, neither of whom 
signed the document or intended to carry it out. On July 21, French 
Prime Minister Edgar Faure met with President Eisenhower, Dulles 
and Lieutenant Colonel Vernon Walters in Geneva. Diem was 
"difficult, " Faure complained. He said Diem should at least pretend 
68 FRUS. 1955-1957. Vol. I, p. 486. 
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that he was gomg through with the election, even if he had no 
intention of doing so. Eisenhower commiserated with Faure but 
shrugged it off. Diem was difficult, he told Faure, but he could not 
eliminate him because no one else was available who personified 
the Vietnamese' popular aspirations. If Diem was eliminated, 
Eisenhower said, Communism would triumph. Faure thanked 
Eisenhower for helicopters he sent for use m North Africa, then 
asked that the United States push Diem toward communicating with 
the Vietminh about the election. Dulles said the Americans had 
already tried to press Diem to be more positive about the election, 
without result. Faure then repeated something Anthony Eden had 
told him: Diem was against the Geneva agreements, but if there had 
not been any Geneva agreements, there would not be any Diem. 
Dulles said Diem was not always logicaI.69 
The United States tried to buy as much time as possible. U.S. 
officials told Diem that he should send some sort of reply to the 
North so he would not appear to be subverting the Geneva 
agreements. The United States was still worried about Vietminh 
retaliation on the one hand and world opinion on the other. It 
would be increasingly difficult for the West to appear to be a 
supporter of Third World independence if Western nations were 
thought to be guilty of blocking the democratic process in Vietnam. 
At the same time, Diem's hold over South Vietnam was still shaky, 
and Dulles tried to bolster him as much as possible. Dulles told 
Reinhardt to tell Diem that the United States was still behind him 
69 Ibid., pp. 492-493. 
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regarding the election. With a brief burst of overconfidence, Dulles 
reasoned that no Communists have ever won a "genuinely" free 
election, and that Diem should not seem fearful of being the first to 
lose to them. It was crucial that Diem establish "authority" m 
Vietnam before any elections were held.7 ° 
By July 25, the Vietminh had not yet renewed hostilities, and 
the Americans were feeling more upbeat about the election 
situation. The British and the French were beginning to come 
around to the U.S. attitude toward the election. Some U.S. officials 
now felt that no direct communication with the Vietminh was 
necessary. Reinhardt, in the meantime, was pushing for a formula 
for election negotiations between the North and the South outside of 
the Geneva provisions. It can be reasonably presumed that such a 
formula would make it easier for the United States to control any 
election conditions to the extent that the North would not find them 
acceptable. An intelligence report sent to Dulles on July 27 further 
helped to allay any residual fears about an imminent Vietminh 
offensive. The report said the Vietminh would probably not take 
any action for at least a year for fear of Western retaliation and 
Communist Bloc "general considerations. "7 1 If the intelligence 
report was true, the United States would have a solid year in which 
to work on postponing the election itself, which was scheduled for 
July 1956. Now that the United States had the support of the British 
and French, who had signed Geneva, the task seemed less daunting, 
at least in terms of public relations. The main concern now was 
7o Ibid .• p. 495. 
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preventing a Vietminh offensive so that Diem could consolidate his 
power. The situation was "a matter of tactics," Young quoted Faure 
as saying, "so as not to provoke the other side." Young said the 
operation would be "extremely delicate. "7 2 
The improving political circumstances, however, gave the 
United States more leeway to prop up Diem militarily. The United 
States, nine days after the consultations were bypassed, 
recommended that Diem's forces be set at 150,000 men by 1956. 
The troops were needed because of the potential for Vietminh 
aggression and for putting down uprisings in South Vietnam. Diem 
was still dealing with sporadic uprisings by two of Vietnam's 
political sects, the Hoa Hao and the Binh Xuyen. The slowing down 
of demobilization set by Geneva was the beginning of a 20-year 
attempt by the United States to create a South Vietnamese army. It 
was more than just a lack of regard for the Geneva agreements, 
which were aimed at demilitarizing Vietnam. The focus on military 
matters made the election and hence reunification next to 
impossible. The stronger Diem became, the more remote the 
chances of an election. The more firepower he had to eliminate 
opposition, the less democratic support he needed to maintain 
power. As long as Diem had soldiers, and as long as he had powerful 
external support, he did not need popular support. And since Diem 
was no democrat, he had no intention of gaining it in a "genuinely 
free" manner. For the next several years, as he tightened his grip on 
72 Ibid., pp. 501-502. 
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power m South Vietnam, his methods became more and more 
violent. 
During the weeks after July 20, 1955, U.S. tactics shifted. 
Dulles was still concerned about giving the Vietminh a reply to their 
request for consultations, but the political crisis had turned out to 
be a false alarm, thanks to a turnaround on the part of the French 
and British and the Soviets' cooperation in not pressing the election. 
On Aug. 3, Dulles told Reinhardt that he still wanted a reply sent to 
Hanoi, but it did not need to be rushed. "[O]ur object is [to] prolong 
[the] consultations process as long as possible," he said in a 
telegram. He told Reinhardt not to press the issue too strongly with 
Diem. The reply to Hanoi was of "secondary importance in 
comparison [with] other imminent questions where heavy U.S. 
pressure may be required," Dulles said.73 The electoral process in 
Vietnam had been of primary importance only when it had to be 
sidestepped. The military process was now the primary focus. The 
U.S. military was thinking 11 months ahead now, to July 1956, 
when the election was to take place. The U.S. command in Indochina 
wanted Washington to rush its authorization for an increase in 
Vietnamese troop strength. U.S. commanders operated on the 
assumption that there would be no electoral victory for the 
Vietminh m 1956, and therefore they expected Communist 
aggression. "Whenever conditions indicated that Jul[y] [19]56 will 
not see a Viet Minh victory, the para-military forces will probably 
be heavily augmented m preparation for extensive guerrilla 
73 Ibid., p. 505. 
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activity, and a clandestine terrorist campaign will be initiated," the 
Pacific commander in chief was advised.74 Popular support for 
Diem, the report continued, was largely dependent upon the size 
and capability of the Vietnamese army. At this point, there were no 
U.S. troops in South Vietnam, at least not officially, but the United 
States was already well on its way toward militarizing what the 
Geneva agreements stipulated should be a political process. The 
Indochina command's pitch for more troops was an example of how 
the military distorted the facts to gain more strength. The chief of 
the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Indochina told the 
Secretary of Defense that the troop strength needed to be increased 
because "to fail to do so invites Viet Minh aggression and fails to 
gam full value of U.S. support to Vietnam." He was more emotional 
with the Pacific command, however: 
It is my seriously considered view that Free 
Vietnam is at the criticial point in its fight for freedom. 
The foundation has been laid for a strong government 
and society which offers opportunity for developing 
the loyalty of its citizens to the point where partisan 
warfare or resistance against the internal as well as 
external invader will be accepted as every man's duty 
and obligation. The Vietnamese people are ripe for an 
active change away from the Viet Minh and toward the 
Free Vietnamese government. A position of military 
strength is basic to the attitude necessary for popular 
support of the Diem govt. 7 5 
Not a word of this was true. But it was good enough for the 
Pacific commander in chief. He told the Pentagon that the MAAG 
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chief, Lieutenant General John "Iron Mike" O'Daniel, "perhaps more 
than any other individual has a keen understanding and immense 
appreciation of the situation in Indochina to include an intimate 
knowledge of Vietnam will and ability to succeed."76 Apparently, 
concern for public opinion was not totally lost at this point, because 
Dulles rejected a simultaneous request for an mcrease in U.S. 
personnel assigned to Vietnam. The Geneva agreements set a ceiling 
of 342, and Dulles wanted to stick to it to avoid accusations of 
sabotaging the agreements. "Some flexibility may later evolve," 
Dulles said, "but at this time it appears desirable to pursue a policy 
which can accommodate the spirit of the Geneva Settlement. "7 7 
It was a curious decision, given the fact that Dulles did not 
care about the spirit of the Geneva agreements. Raising the number 
of U.S. military personnel in Vietnam by a small amount would not 
have affected public opinion to any significant degree. Some believe 
the United States already had more than the 342 allowed. If that 
was true, Dulles possibly thought adding more would force the 
North's hand. It was more likely that Dulles had no loophole to 
exploit, since the number of foreign troops allowed in Vietnam was 
one of the few specifics the agreements mandated. It 1s even more 
likely, given the fact that Lieutenant Colonel Edward Lansdale was 
already in Vietnam setting up a covert operation, that more 
military advisers were already m Vietnam masquerading as 
civilians. Beyond mere speculation, however, it is safe to say that 
Dulles, in 1955 at least, wanted Diem, not the United States, to 
76 Ibid., p. 511. 
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shoulder the military burden. However, creating a South 
Vietnamese army violated the spirit of Geneva just as much as 
increasing U.S. troop strength. So his deference to Geneva m 
rejecting the request was disingenuous. 
Diem's problems remained, however. He was still fighting 
sectarian revolts and he was afraid of Communist subversion in the 
South. The embassy m Saigon, together with a team of academics 
from Michigan State University (and, presumably, Lansdale, Diem's 
close adviser, whose name is conspicuously absent from declassified 
U.S. documents), began to prepare a plan for an internal security 
force with which Diem could implement his power. The U.S. team in 
Saigon wanted to establish a single security force within the 
Ministry of the Interior. It would be a national organization 
comprising three major subdivisions: 
• The National Police, totaling 25,000 men. They would 
provide law enforcement in all areas of South Vietnam, excluding 
the four major municipalities. Included among their duties would 
be counter-intelligence, countering subversive activities and 
forming a "nationwide police communications net." 
• "Semi-autonomous" municipal police forces, totaling from 
4,000 to 6,000 men. They would perform the same duties in the 
four major cities. 
• A Vietnamese Bureau of Investigation of 4,000 men. They 
would act as the equivalent of the U.S. Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, Customs Service, CIA, and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco 
and Firearms. 
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The plan would cost an additional $2.5 million for fiscal year 
1956, including an increase in the number of "advisers" stationed in 
Vietnam . Also included was $606,000 to buy riot guns, revolvers, 
tear gas, ammunition, etc., beyond what was available through 
surplus sources. This request was granted on October 10. 
The fact that a police network was needed, and the scope of 
the system itself, would be unremarkable under other 
circumstances. In Vietnam in 1955, however, it amounted to the 
construction of a police state in which the means of terror and 
repression took precedence over the establishment of the 
democratic process. South Vietnam, at that point, was operating in a 
political vacuum. Geneva had created what Hannah Arendt, 
discussing revolution in general, called "the space where freedom 
can appear." The North and the South were supposed to be 
regroupmg, with freedom of movement between the two sides, 
while plans were supposed to be made for an election that would 
reunify the country. After that, governmental institutions were to 
be formed by the duly elected officials. Although it was not put m 
these terms, it was supposed to be a bottom-up democratic process, 
emanating from the people of Vietnam, a reward for their 25-year 
struggle against the French to overthrow colonial repression. The 
United States, however, was stepping into this void and setting up 
its own client government. And srnce it was an unpopular 
government, it needed to be a police state. It was a second line of 
militarization beyond the establishment of armed forces loyal to 
Diem, one which allowed him to put down insurrections from within 
as well as from without. It was why the United States was already 
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planning military and security needs into 1957, beyond the point 
the election was scheduled to be held. 
The perceived need for this police state was based more upon 
fear than upon hard analysis. Ambassador Reinhardt told Dulles on 
August 31 that only the Vietminh themselves knew how strong 
they were 1n the South. They were operating "covertly and 
unobtrusively," leaving the actual sabotage and terrorism to the 
"disgruntled Nationalist elements," Reinhardt said. Diem's people 
often cited the perceived Communist strength in the South as the 
chief factor precluding National Assembly elections for the South 
alone. The extent to which the Vietminh would play a role in 
Southern elections was an unknown and cause for anxiety. At the 
same time, however, Diem and his supporters downplayed 
Communist strength to encourage the Americans and themselves, 
Reinhardt said. All of Diem's opponents were lumped together as 
"lackeys of Colonialists, Communists and Feudalists." In any event, 
Reinhardt admitted that Diem's forces were not able to break up the 
Vietminh cadres in the South. 78 Because of the Vietminh strength 
and the hard loyalty they enjoyed, informants were relatively 
scarce, and the quality of information was often suspect. As a result , 
any group that criticized Diem was considered a Vietminh front. 
Lumped together were the Buddhists, agricultural associations and 
pacifists. All had legitimate cause for opposing Diem. Yet, even U.S. 
officials, who were aware of the distortions wi fhin the agrarian 
system, lumped protesting farmers in with everyone else. Reinhardt 
78 Ibid ., pp. 530-531. 
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blamed all of them for g1vmg the Vietminh "appropriate channels 
for applying pressure" and demanding consultations and elections. 
It was yet another opportunity for the United States and Diem to 
turn Geneva on its head. Those crying for free elections were now 
obviously Communists, smce the Communists were the ones 
applying pressure for the consultations. And since they were 
Communists, they were not in favor of freedom. Therefore, the 
elections were no longer a means to be free. They were a means 
toward Communist enslavement. It was an effective syllogism for 
the American effort to block the election while professing support 
for democracy. 
Meanwhile, the U.S. shifted further toward a military solution. 
In early September 1955, the Defense Department asked the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff to produce a strategy for warfare against the 
Vietminh. The report included the possibility of taking over North 
Vietnam, with nuclear weapons if needed. If North Vietnam 
attacked, the Joint Chiefs said, the United States would have to 
launch a naval and air attack and send in ground troops. They 
estimated it would take less than a year to repulse a Vietminh 
attack - longer, "should employment of atomic weapons not be 
authorized. "79 It was obvious that the Joint Chiefs thought atom 
bombs were the way to take care of the Vietminh threat. "... [N]o 
prohibitions should be imposed on the use of atomic weapons, or on 
other military operations, to the extent of precluding effective 
military reaction as the situation develops," they suggested. "The 
79 Ibid., p. 537. 
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Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that if atomic weapons were not used, 
greater forces than the U.S. would be justified in providing would 
probably be needed. "80 If the election were actually held, they 
suggested, military maneuvers m the region just beforehand could 
be a pyschological weapon. 
The thought of attacking North Vietnam did not erase the 
public relations problem haunting the United States. Diem, U.S. 
officials claimed, was gaining in popularity and becoming even 
more independent-minded. This made it more difficult for the 
Americans to maintain the facade it had strained to erect: that the 
West wanted free elections. No one in the State Department 
believed that the elections would take place, but avoiding the 
consultations prevented it from implementing the high-stakes game 
it was playing. If there were no consultations, then the United 
States could not demand the kind of electoral conditions that would 
make Ho storm from the bargaining table. On September 20, Pham 
Van Dong complained to the Geneva co-chairmen, Anthony Eden of 
Great Britain and V.M. Molotov of the Soviet Union, about the delay 
in implementing the electoral consultations. The State Department, 
presumably Dulles himself, wanted the Saigon embassy to estimate 
how far the United States could press Diem into talking to the 
Vietminh indirectly. Diem would not make any commitment to the 
election during these · talks but it would at least constitute a 
response to the Vietminh. The Americans' jealously guarded 
prestige was at stake within the confines of world opinion, and 
80 Ibid., pp. 539-540. 
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Diem was holding it hostage. The United States wanted to push for 
just enough communication with the Vietminh to appease them and 
the Geneva principals without angering Diem or his supporters. At 
the same time, Diem could not be allowed to anger the North 
enough to precipitate renewed warfare. It almost seemed as if Diem 
had the power to decide whether the United States would have to 
drop atomic bombs on the North. With no acceptable alternative to 
Diem, the United States seemed more and more dependent on him. 
The Saigon embassy suggested that Diem call for National Assembly 
elections m South Vietnam as a prerequisite for all-Vietnam 
elections. That would buy more time and also solidify Diem's 
political hold. But U.S. officials would have to be careful in dealing 
with Diem. They could not press too hard. "Although our ability [to] 
exert pressure is apparently great because of [the] government's 
dependency on U.S. support," the embassy told the State 
Department, "in actual fact, if we wish our efforts to be effective we 
can do little more than use ardent persuasion, basing our arguments 
exclusively on Vietnam's self-interest. "81 
Diem was planning that and much more. He told the 
Americans on September 28 that he planned to hold two referenda 
- one on whether Bao Dai should be deposed as the head of state, 
the second on a draft constitution - before holding National 
Assembly elections. Ambassador Reinhardt did not like the plan. He 
8 l Ibid., p. 542. The premise Dulles used was that Diem could not speak for the 
Vietnamese people without an electoral mandate . Therefore , he could not 
agree to holding elections, since his people had not yet expressed their views. 
He did not mention, however, that the United States was empowering Diem 
militarily and set him up as the South's leader without a democratic mandate, 
or that free speech was not high on Diem's priority list. 
62 
did not want a referendum on the constitution or on Bao Dai. He 
thought the assembly should take care of those issues. Diem, 
however, was afraid that a constitution drafted by the assembly 
would undercut his power. He wanted a strong-president 
government. Despite his concerns, Reinhardt said the plan would 
improve Diem's situation and could be the most democracy possible 
in South Vietnam. Besides, Diem seemed determined, and it was 
unlikely that the United States could change his mind without 
exerting significant pressure, something U.S. officials felt they could 
not do. The best they could do was to make it clear to Diem that U.S. 
support was riding on his commitment to hold the National 
Assembly elections. 
Kenneth Young, the director of the Office of Philippine and 
Southeast Asian Affairs, disagreed with Reinhardt. He thought the 
assembly elections could backfire. "Democracies m newly 
independent Asian countries are unpredictable things," he said, 
"and first elections like first experiences in anything are utterly 
unpredictable." His reasoning was ironic: Truly free, secret elections 
could result in Communist gains. It was too risky. " .. . [P]remature or 
excessive popular representation might submerge the still very frail 
structure we have been able to help Diem put together ... "8 2 
Young was the first to come out and say that the United States 
could go ahead with its policy with the assumption that the 1956 
election would not be held. He then accurately predicted the 
situation in Vietnam in the then near future: 
82 Ibid., pp. 550-551. Emphasis added. 
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Barring major hostilities, the South will remain 
under a non-Communist regime for some time, despite 
great difficulties in the South owing largely to the 
administrative weaknesses of the Diem government, 
the unknown capabilities of the Viet Minh and 
mounting economic deficiencies. . .. I do not see any 
immediate prospects for an acceptable politicial 
unification. Judging only by such indications as the 
passing of July 20 without major incident, the rather 
leisurely pace which all the Communist leaders have 
so far followed regarding the consultation issue, and 
the hints from the Viet Minh on zonal 'autonomy,' one 
can now speculate that Communist diplomacy will not 
put on unbearable pressure regarding this issue of 
unification by Geneva, although it may be heavy. . .. 
We got over the July 20 hurdle surprisingly well .... 8 3 
Young suggested that U.S. officials now take a longer view of 
their role in Vietnam. Establishing a government in the South could 
take years, and evidently Ho was not in a position to push for the 
Geneva electoral provisions. Young had read a study of government 
in Southeast Asia by Harvard professor Rupert Emerson, who said 
no one studying governments m the region should do so with a 
"fixed preconception that they should conform to established 
Western models."84 Young saw this as ammunition for allowing a 
strong central government in South Vietnam, one that could solidify 
power without Western-style democratic processes. 
83 Thid.., p. 552. 
84 Ibid. The quote is from Rupert Emerson, Representative Government in 
Southeast Asia (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955), pp. 16, 192. 
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Now that the actual 1956 election was swept from the table -
at least among U.S. officials - the only problems remaining were 
maintaining the pretense toward democracy, proppmg up Diem and 
being ready militarily in case the Vietminh attacked. The first and 
third problems were not really problems for the United States; 
there was plenty of ordnance and plenty of propaganda tools such 
as the aforementioned. But bolstering Diem, despite the influx of 
money, arms and advice, continued to be a problem. Dulles wanted 
Diem to go ahead with the National Assembly elections as a way of 
solidifying political support - as long, of course, as it did not 
backfire. Making sure Diem was strong took precedence over any 
"representative and constitutional processes," Dulles told 
Reinhardt.85 
followers win. 
The underlying message was: Make sure Diem and his 
The problem was that Diem did not have the support, even in 
South Vietnam, something Reinhardt readily admitted. He also did 
not know how strong the anti-Diem groups were, since Diem 
smothered expressions of opposition. In fact, it was illegal for 
Diem's opponents to speak freely. Even with that, Reinhardt said it 
was "highly doubtful" that Diem supporters would constitute a 
majority in the assembly if the elections were completely free. He 
would do better, Reinhardt said, if the elections were 
controlled. Despite the drawbacks, Reinhardt said Diem "can be 
counted on ... to see to it that [the] Assembly if and when [it is] 
created contains [a] comfortable government majority. "86 
85 lb.id.., p. 559. 
86 Ibid., p. 563. 
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On October 23, Vietnamese in the South went to the polls to 
decide on who their leader should be. They were given a choice 
between Diem and Bao Dai, the playboy emperor who was a puppet 
of the French and still held a figurehead position in Vietnam. The 
results of the referendum: Diem, 98.2 percent; Bao Dai, 1.1 percent; 
invalid votes, .7 percent. Reinhardt said the balloting was done in a 
"democratic fashion." In fact, it was rigged, with the expert help of 
Lansdale. Diem officials counted the ballots, unsupervised. Some 
districts reported more votes for Diem than there were actual 
voters.87 
The referendum results were strong leverage for Diem against 
both his opponents and the United States. Armed with a mandate, 
real or imagined, Diem pressed forward with his demand for more 
military ordnance from the United States . Without better internal 
security, he reasoned, the assembly elections would be impossible. 
This cat-and-mouse game between Diem and the United States 
would continue until Diem's overthrow m 1963. A similar game 
devoted to the all-Vietnam elections, however, had just about 
played itself out. By the end of 1955, seven months before the 
election was to be held , it was a dead issue, for all intents and 
purposes. Hanoi still complained about the delay, as did Moscow 
and Beijing, but the United States and Diem had no intention of 
going through with them, and Hanoi could not force the issue. 
Young's analysis proved prescient. Others in the State Department 
began talking about long-term plans for Vietnam. Diem got himself 
87 Kahin, Intervention, p. 95. 
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a pliant National Assembly. Neither the consultations nor the all-
Vietnam elections was ever held. There was no conference to decide 
the issue, no public declaration condemning the failure to hold the 
election. It was a political faceoff that melted away without face-to-
face confrontation. 
In February 1956, Dulles sent Eisenhower a memorandum 
stating that the election "should be deferred beyond the July date." 
Dulles was considering the establishment of a new International 
Control Commission to ensure "the necessary safeguards" for free 
elections. Meanwhile, he told Eisenhower, U.S. policy in Vietnam had 
three prongs: bolster Diem, weaken the North through "political and 
psychological warfare," and develop "some new arrangement which 
would permit gradual termination of the old Geneva Accords. "8 8 
The new arrangement appeared as a gift dumped into the laps 
of Diem and Dulles. Just as Diem could not have refused to go 
through with the elections without U.S. backing, Ho could not force 
the issue without Soviet and/or Chinese backing. Diem got his 
backing, but Ho did not. From July 1954 to December 1955, he sent 
more than a dozen notes to Eden and Molotov urging that the 
election process begin. None of them was answered. The reason was 
that Moscow was not interested in committing itself to Hanoi's 
hard-won spoils. In the spnng of 1956, Lord Reading, the British 
minister of state, held talks with Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet 
deputy foreign minister. Gromyko asked for a new conference in 
Geneva. The request was rejected, but the United States correctly 
88 U.S. State Department, "Memorandum for the President," February 10, 1956, 
No. 1982/478, DDRS. 
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concluded that Moscow would not take a risk on Vietnam, smce the 
Soviets were looking for better relations with the West and its 
relationship with China was deteriorating. Gromyko did not press 
for the election, and he agreed to maintaining the status quo in 
Vietnam.89 
In January 1957, Khrushchey suggested the official division of 
Vietnam; China agreed. The Vietminh, who fought for nine years to 
expel the French colonialists, had been sold out by their allies . They 
were in no economic or military position to fight another war by 
themselves. The United States now had the freedom to build a 
nation in South Vietnam, and Diem had the freedom to consolidate 
his power. Between 1957 and 1959, the repression would grow so 
vicious that it would lead to the rise of the National Liberation Front 
and the eventual resumption of warfare. 
89 Kahin , Intervention, p. 91. He bases his information on State Department 
and CIA intelligence reports. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The idea of Communism triumphing by an 
electoral process was far worse for the future of 
American interests in Asia than if the Vietminh 
took up arms against the creation of the Saigon 
government and actually succeeded in winning on 
the battlefield.9 O 
The U.S. role in the subversion of the 1956 Vietnam election 
has been only superficially treated in the burgeoning collection of 
histories of the war. Although many of the documents that shed 
light on the issue were declassified in the 1980s, two major studies 
of the war have been published since and have failed to examine 
the election question closely. Kahin's Intervention, which is 
otherwise a comprehensive treatment of the U.S. role in the 
Vietnam War, devotes several pages to the election but fails to note 
the issue's significance, either as a historical turning point in itself 
or as a cogent example of the kind of thinking that led the United 
States to a deeper involvement m Vietnam. 
Kolko's Anatomy of a War, which goes further in explaining 
North Vietnam's role, barely mentions the election at all. While 
surprising on its face, given the importance Ho attached to the 
elections, Kolko's study is largely favorable toward the North, and 
90 Gardner, Approaching Vietnam, p. 348. 
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Ho was not without error in his analysis of the circumstances 
leading up to 1956. He accepted a Geneva document that failed to 
spell out the precise conditions under which elections would be 
held. He expected the French, who waged a nine-year war to hold 
onto its colony, to guarantee the election. At the same time, he 
recognized that Vietnam needed a period of peace to rebuild itself, 
and the justifiable fear he had of U.S. intervention erased some of 
the leverage the Vietminh earned with their military victory. In 
Ho's defense, he could not have predicted that the Soviets and the 
Chinese would use Vietnam as a negotiating card during 
superpower negotiations. He was dependent upon China and the 
Soviet Union for support in bringing about the election but failed to 
recognize the Soviet desire for detente with the West, which led to 
the Soviet decision to let Ho and his election slide. For just as the 
election could not be subverted without U.S. approval, it could not 
be realized without Soviet and/or Chinese backing. What happened 
between 1954 and 1956 in Vietnam was a product of superpower 
needs and desires, not of a political boundary drawn across the 
17th parallel in Vietnam. 
Evidence of Vietnam's interpretation and analysis of the 
causes and effects of the war is difficult to find in the United States. 
That leaves a giant void in Americans' understanding of the war. 
Americans control the history of the Vietnam War through the far-
reaching U.S. media and publishing industry, and they have been 
obsessed during the past quarter century with the questions, "Why 
did we get involved?" and "What went wrong?" The problem is that 
most historians have relegated the second question almost 
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exclusively to the Johnson Administration. The mistake, according 
to the accepted wisdom, is that American troops were sent in in 
increasing numbers, and that the United States had no political 
foundation upon which to fight a military war. While true in and of 
itself, it does not go back far enough. The mistake lay in the 
thinking and policy that gave birth to Johnson's escalation, and its 
genesis was in the 15 years after World War II, when the United 
States presided over an unfortunate marriage between a perceived 
need to control world events and a rabid anti-Communism . 
One reason for the short shrift given the election issue by 
historians is the relative lack of information available. Assessing the 
meaning of the election subversion and placing it rn a greater 
historical context involves an examination of available data that 
recognizes the information missing. The matter of the Vietnam 
election was a covert operation before Geneva even ended, and 
what was not said in the ensuing months was also significant. We 
know that in June 1954, before the Geneva agreements were even 
signed, a covert "psywar" program was set into motion by Lansdale 
in Vietnam. We know that it was directed by the Central 
Intelligence Agency, which was headed by Allen Dulles. Yet, for all 
the importance assigned to a victory in Vietnam over Communism, 
the Dulles brothers mentioned the issue only a handful of times 
between 1954 and 1956 during their countless telephone 
conversations. Most of those conversations about Vietnam were in a 
cryptic sort of spy language that is unintelligible to the lay reader. 
Many were censored. Other conversations involving John Foster 
Dulles mentioned Vietnam only in passing. For example, Dulles told 
7 1 
Walter Bedell Smith on July 19, 1954, two days before Geneva was 
signed, that they should not talk about the election issue over the 
telephone. 
The press offered little or no help in shedding light on the 
matter for American citizens during the mid-1950s. Only one 
magazine article was devoted to the election in the entire decade. It 
was in America, a national Catholic periodical, and it was 100 
percent behind Dulles and Diem. The New York Times offered 
occasional coverage, mostly concerning the electoral process. For the 
most part, it was not a critic of the Eisenhower administration's 
activity m Vietnam, and it did not treat the election issue as 
anything more than what the government said it was: a ruse by the 
Communists, and therefore unworthy of serious consideration. 
And what of President Eisenhower? His name is conspicuously 
absent from nearly all of the pertinent documents thus far made 
available. Without deeper examination, this would seem to affirm 
Eisenhower's popular image as a laissez-faire president who 
delegated much of his authority to others. In fact, Eisenhower was a 
quite active but highly buffered actor on the world political stage, 
as demonstrated by the frequent intervention into foreign countries 
during the 1950s. Eisenhower knew what Dulles was doing and 
agreed with his goals, at the very least. Dulles, Eisenhower said, "has 
never made a senous pronouncement, agreement or proposal 
without complete and exhaustive consultations with me m advance, 
and, of course, my approval. "91 Eisenhower has often been praised 
91 Robert Griffith (ed.), Ike's Letters to a Friend: 1941 to 1958 (Lawrence, 
Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 1984), p. 134. 
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for showing restraint in Vietnam, unlike Johnson and Kennedy. He 
decided against sending troops, despite the hysteria of the 1950s, 
right after China, Korea and the development of the Soviet 
hydrogen bomb. Eisenhower, however, wanted to intervene m 
Vietnam but was not satisfied with the way the French and the 
British were handling the matter. Eisenhower would intervene only 
if there was a commitment, especially by the French, to Vietnamese 
independence, and only if the Franco-Vietnamese War were 
internationalized - i.e., transformed from a colonial war to an anti-
Communist one. Without those two agreements, Eisenhower did not 
achieve "the conditions under which I felt the United States could 
properly intervene to protect its own interests. "9 2 
So, Eisenhower was no less of an interventionist than Johnson. 
He was, however, more prudent. Maybe because of his military 
expertise, Eisenhower knew what was needed for intervention to 
work. "A proper political foundation for any military action was 
essential," he said.93 " ... [A]ny nation that intervenes in a civil war 
can scarcely expect to win unless the side in whose favor it 
intervenes possesses a high morale based upon a war purpose or 
cause in which it believes. "94 Eisenhower was also quite forthright 
about American chances of winning a war in Vietnam. Even if 
Indochina were cleared of "Commies," he said, China was next door 
with "inexhaustable manpower. "95 
92 Th.id.., p. 11. 
93 Ibid. , p. 135. 
94 Th.id.., p. 125. 
95 Robert H. Ferrell (ed .), The Eisenhower Diaries (New York, N .Y.: W.W. 
Norton & Co., 1981) , p. 190. 
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As for the election itself, Eisenhower said next to nothing, 
despite having admitted earlier that Ho would win easily. Lansdale 
was not any more forthcoming. He was Diem's righthand man 
during the subversion process, and he states in his memoirs that he 
was sent to Vietnam to do whatever was necessary to head off a 
Communist election victory. Not suprisingly, Lansdale asserted that 
Diem would have won any election, and he blames the Geneva co-
chairmen, Britain and the Soviet Union, for canceling the 
plebescite.96 
Vietnam, for Eisenhower, was not much more than a footnote 
m his personal history of his presidency, and by the time the 
election was supposed to be held, in July 1956, his government was 
already preoccupied with other matters, beginning with the Suez 
Canal crisis and continuing with other Cold War crises, such as the 
Hungarian revolution in 1956, Sputnik in 1957, conflicts over 
Quemoy and Matsu, two islands off mainland China, in 1958, and 
renewed tensions in Berlin in 1959. North Vietnam continued to 
press for consultations, to no avail. In the meantime, Diem's 
consolidation of power grew more violent. Thousands of political 
prisoners were executed because they were communists or worked 
with them.97 By 1959, the Vietminh and the embryonic National 
Liberation Front began to answer Diem's violence with their own. 
96 Edward G. Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars (New York, N.Y.: Harper & Row, 
1972). p. 344. 
97 Kolko, Anatomy of a War, p. 89. 
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The United States did not forget about the election, however. 
In 1965, as the United States was gearing up for military escalation 
m Vietnam, McGeorge Bundy asked for a report on the election 
question. According to the report,98 the 1956 election was not held 
in Vietnam simply because the United States would lose. "The plain 
fact is that we and the South Vietnamese realized that we would 
lose any elections held in Viet-Nam. Elections, therefore, were not 
held," Salans told Bundy. While the passage of time afforded a more 
forthright admission than offered 10 years earlier, the conclusions 
were no different. Since the Communists would probably win m 
1965, Salans concluded, the United States should still hold to its 
position that the proper conditions for elections did not exist. It is 
no surprise that the hindsight in Washington in 1965 was no better 
than the foresight there in 1955. If Johnson's men had ventured a 
more clearheaded second guess, they may have concluded that the 
United States could have pulled out of Vietnam in July 1955, after 
Diem had refused to proceed with the election consultations. Dulles 
could have blamed Diem for the undermining of democracy and 
thus saved American face. 
Twelve days after the Salans report, however, General 
Maxwell Taylor, the U.S. ambassador in Saigon, reported that the 
Communists would lose a truly free election.99 American officials in 
Saigon had not made much progress in realistic analysis. 
98 U.S. State Department, Memorandum from Carl F. Salans to McGeorge 
Bundy, March 6, 1965, p. 5, No. 1981/234C, DDRS. 
99 General Maxwell Taylor to the State Department, March 16, 1965, p. 1, No. 
1981/237B, DDRS. Taylor based his assessment on information from a source 
whose name was deleted from the document - possibly Lansdale's or one of 
his associates. 
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By 1965, the apparent conflict in U.S. thinking and whether 
the Communists would win or lose was irrelevant. What was 
relevant was the fact that high-ranking U.S. officials were 
concerned at all about the election issue, ten years after it was 
timely and shortly before they would send in American troops on a 
large scale. It was but one example of the kind of thinking that 
drove U.S. policy toward Vietnam: inchoate, illusory, dogmatic. It 
was based upon the negation of a competing world view, not on the 
establishment of positive solutions. That policy was deeply flawed 
in 1965, as the United States would learn much later, and it was 
just as flawed in 1955, and for the same reasons. America's role in 
the unheld Vietnamese election in 1956 was an early turning point 
in the U.S. struggle in Vietnam, a conflict whose existence had 
barely penetrated American consciousness. At the root of U.S. policy 
in the 1950s was a belief that the United States could be the 
pnmary architect of geopolitical structure without making a 
commitment to the means with which that structure was built. The 
result was that the United States could covertly subvert an 
internationally recognized election process while publicly making 
righteous pronouncements on democracy. The assumption was that 
Vietnam and other Third World nations would be the battlefield on 
which this Cold War struggle would be fought. U.S. officials, 
however, suffered from a deeply flawed perception of international 
relations and how the United States fit into those relationships. It 
was a perception based . upon a self-perception: that the United 
States was inherently righteous, and that it was therefore 
responsible for spreading that righteousness throughout the 
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world.100 An important part of this attitude was a sort of political 
evangelism, an American white man's burden. Since World War II, 
those who have held power m the United States - almost 
exclusively white, male, Christian and middle- to upper-class - have 
taken it upon themselves to proceed from this self-perception to 
repeated interventions into the affairs of other nations, almost 
I 
exclusively to the detriment of democratic principle. As Gardner 
argues, the repeated disruption of liberal democracy throughout the 
world has served to perpetuate the Cold War. In the meantime, the 
United States, in its blind efforts to establish global influence, failed 
to recognize the changes occurring in the colonized nations, where 
empire was already doomed. 
In the case of Vietnam during the 195Os the foreign policy 
that grew from that perception contained the following 
characteristics. 
The need for prestige. This was one of the pnmary driving 
forces behind American foreign policy in the 195Os. The word 
"prestige" surfaces agam and again in the speeches and writings of 
U.S. officials - in both the executive and legislative branches - as 
they discussed the stakes inherent in playing a significant role on 
the world political stage. This preternatural attention to world 
opinion was an outgrowth of the perceived struggle between 
Communism and capitalism, which most Americans saw as a 
clearcut dichotomy dividing the world into two camps. This made it 
impossible for U.S. diplomats to recognize the respect Ho Chi Minh 
l00 · Use of the past tense here is not preclusive. These assumptions have not 
changed, despite the American loss in Vietnam. 
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had for the American democratic tradition, to which he paid tribute 
in the Vietnamese declaration of independence from the French in 
1945. It made it impossible for the United States to believe that Ho 
was not a puppet of Moscow or Beijing, which he was not. He was 
merely dependent upon outside help for the success of Vietnamese 
independence. But the American political evangelism was not so 
much a positive statement of principles as a negation of 
Communism, and that made it impossible for the United States to 
embrace a movement that was Communist m name but nationalist 
and, at the time, politically flexible. Among some Americans, it was 
not even enough for a foreign people to renounce Communism; it 
had to embrace the American political message. That led one 
American official who was helping to shape foreign policy to speak 
of "all-out neutralism." The choice is one or the other: Americanism 
or Communism. A small, disadvantaged nation, especially one the 
United States deemed crucial to the geopolitical balance, had no 
other choice. What the United States apparently failed to recognize 
1s that such a policy automatically reduced its own alternatives: 
The narrowing of choices. U.S. policy in the 1950s was one 
of negation and exclusion. Therefore, it was inherently narrow. If 
cultivating an approachable Ho Chi Minh was not one of the options 
U.S. officials allowed themselves, then trying to influence the course 
of events in foreign nations could be accomplished only by bribery, 
sabotage, aggress10n or military intervention. The United States, in 
that order, used all of these tactics in Vietnam, and failed at every 
one. Its exclusionary foreign policy, coupled with the need for 
international prestige, painted it into a corner. Going through with 
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the elections was never an option. Offering much-needed economic 
aid to the nation as a whole, even as a ploy to influence internal 
affairs, was never an option . U.S. policy had already been placed 
upon a very narrow track in 1950, when the United States assumed 
much of the cost of the French effort against the Vietnamese. Once 
that failed, the only path for American diplomatic logic was to 
declare that Vietnam was a high priority in the fight against 
Communism, and no Communist victory, especially an electoral one, 
would be tolerated. It was an intrinsically militaristic path, even 
though no troops would be sent for 10 years. Long before Tet, the 
United States had eliminated peaceful, political development as an 
alternative. 
As a result of these narrowed choices, foreign policy was 
distinctly shortsighted. Longterm political goals were pushed aside 
as diplomats dealt with the constant brush fires Diem faced while 
trying to establish his power without the benefit of public backing. 
The United States diplomats, therefore, were preoccupied with 
tactics, not strategy. The available documents on their role in the 
unheld elections in Vietnam are more remarkable for what they do 
not reveal than for what they reveal. Throughout the period from 
the Geneva negotiations through the handwringing over the 
election, nothing is said at all about what would be in store for the 
United States and Diem three, four or five years down the road. U.S. 
diplomats were exclusively concerned with Diem's lack of security 
and with the next bump in the road. The most foresight shown was 
in military matters, specifically how much of an increase in troops 
would be needed. Bolstering Diem and putting off the election 
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indefinitely eclipsed any concern about what would happen next. It 
was a policy of tactics and no strategy. 
The political catch-22. American officials realized that the 
1956 election presented them with a situation in which they had to 
subvert the elections so "democracy" could wm. It was the result of 
a need for political control taking priority over the ostensible export 
of democracy. In the American sense of political reality, the double-
standard allows national independence without self-determination. 
All that is needed is a pro-American stand-in and an influx of 
American economic and military aid with which to establish this 
"independence." 
Lack of coherent priorities. A maJor consequence of the 
American political evangelism was the belief that the United States 
not only should carry out everything it wanted, but could carry 
them out. The belief that nothing was beyond their grasp led U.S. 
officials to the conclusion that well-considered priorities were 
unnecessary. It did not matter which goal was at hand. All of them 
would be realized at some point, or all at once if need be. It was 
assumed that American power and and influence should be global 
and therefore all-encompassing. Short of nuclear war, there was 
therefore no limit to the steps that would be taken to make the 
world safe for democracy, i.e., containing Communism. The result 
was that a small nation few people had heard of became a top 
priority within the United States government, even though it had 
little economic value, aside from being a market and source of raw 
materials for Japan, and its "loss" to Communism would not have 
upset the global balance of power. The arena in which this war of 
80 
prestige was fought did not matter. By extension, therefore, the 
indigenous conditions in Vietnam were irrelevant to the United 
States, except in some areas where they presented obstacles to the 
creation of puppet regimes. For the United States, no conditions 
existed except those that fed into its world dichotomy. American 
leaders therefore ignored what was left. The problem was that 
therein lay the root of their downfall. There was no analysis of the 
Vietnamese commitment to true independence and freedom, and an 
underestimation of their desire for self-determination. It was as if, 
once the Americans decided in 1954 that they would supplant the 
French in Vietnam, the history of Vietnam was supposed to begin 
once again. The Americans' belief in their omnipotence erased 
Dienbienphu from memory. It is one example of what Kahin calls a 
"short institutional memory," whereby succeeding administrations 
somehow forgot what went on previously. The belief m 
omnipotence made that possible. "I decided . . . that having put our 
hand to the plow, we would not look back," Dean Acheson said of 
the Truman administration's decision to bankroll the French m 
Vietnam. 101 Dulles did not look back, either, nor did Rusk, 
McNamara, Johnson or Lodge. U.S. officials were more concerned 
with carrying out their policy, not examining it. As Kolko notes: "The 
nature of the United States' system defined its goals and also its 
perceptions of reality, which rn turn circumscribed its possible 
actions. Its consc10usness was a function of needs and interests 
rather than of a desire to perceive facts by some objective, scientific 
101 Kahin, Intervention, p. 33. 
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criterion, for the concern of the system was not truth but rather 
power, and this was partly the cause of its contradictions and 
failures."102 
Incoherent principles. Political evangelism paired with a 
perceived omnipotence obviated any sense of moral consistency. In 
1950, when the United States committed itself to risking its prestige 
in Vietnam, it was moving to rearm Japan while seeking to isolate 
China. It was quite a change in attitude from five years before. At 
that time, President Roosevelt had supported struggles for 
independence, albeit weakly. In 1945, the Vietnamese nationalists 
had thrown out the Japanese, who had supplanted the French, who 
in turn collaborated to some extent with the Japanese occupation. 
Six years after the Allies forced the Germans from France, the 
United States was helping France reclaim its colony. This lack of 
moral principle 1s probably less surprising, however, than the lack 
of any protest m the West. If American officials assumed that 
Vietnam was French chattel in 1950, no loss of conviction is needed 
to assume in 1955 that the Vietnamese had no right to a fair 
election. The result was that, in the American black-and-white 
world view, allowing the election represented a lack of democracy, 
while preventing the election made Vietnam "free." 
Dependence upon dependents. The unheld elections of 
1956 are often discussed within the context of assigning blame for 
their unofficial cancellation. No irrefutable evidence 1s available 
today that proves that the United States ordered Diem to refuse to 
102 Kolko, Anatomy of a War, p. 153. 
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go along with the election process. It is a moot point, however, smce 
none was needed. Just as Eastern Europe has distanced itself from 
Communism only because it is clear that the Soviet Union will no 
longer intervene, as it did in Hungary and Czechoslovakia m 
previous attempts, Diem was able to rebuff the Vietminh because 
he was allowed to by the nation that held power in South Vietnam: 
the United States. "I suppose that in the last analysis," Dulles said in 
1954, "these things [the Geneva negotiations] come down to the 
question of who has the power to make a settlement." 103 If 
Eisenhower and Dulles had possessed the moral and political 
fortitude to force Diem to go through with the election, Diem would 
have had to do so, or else risk being replaced. Instead, Dulles 
encouraged Diem to subvert the Geneva agreements, using a crass 
public rhetoric defending freedom while cynically using the 
Vietnamese to further U.S. "interests" in the world by avoiding an 
election the Communists would win. They took this position because 
Diem was as important to them as they were to Diem. With so much 
already invested in Vietnam by the time Geneva concluded m 1954, 
the United States could not risk allowing a popular leader to 
emerge, especially since it was obvious that Ho would win any 
election. Because of the political stakes involved, the United States 
had to have a friendly man rn power in Saigon. But since the 
Vietminh were so popular, finding a suitable candidate was 
difficult. The United States chose Diem, who lacked public support 
but espoused the correct political principles, i.e., a willingness to use 
103 U.S. Senate, Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
Vol. VI, 1954, p. 163. Dulles made the comment on February 24, 1954. 
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American resources to fight Communism. The problem for the 
United States was that it had to fight this war on someone else's 
territory with foreign bodies, and therefore it was just as 
dependent on Diem as Diem was dependent on the United States for 
his power. 
The relationship between Diem and the United States was 
different from that of a quisling to a colonial power, however. 
While Diem derived his power from the United States, the United 
States did not hold complete power over him. Because Diem was 
possibly the only person who was available for U.S. purposes -
someone who was not forever tainted by collaborating with the 
French - the United States needed him m power, or else no one 
would be there to fight its war. Hence, the infusion of economic and 
military aid, the establishment of a police state, the toleration of 
political repression and then violence. Geneva, for all its flaws, had 
created Arendt's "space where freedom can appear," and into that 
space the United States placed the beginnings of a society based 
upon militarism, the only kind of society the United States could 
count on for support in its war. 
Its dependence upon an untenable regime created 
circumstances that would make this war unwinnable for the United 
States. It consciously changed the "solution" in Vietnam from a 
political one to a military one. In the process, American political 
leaders confused institutional power for real power. They thought 
that Diem, if handed the tools of authority and allowed to construct 
his own institutions, would achieve genuine power, which only 
popular support, gauged by fair elections, can provide. For the 
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United States to achieve global influence, it needed not democracy 
but personalism, the kind of caudillo who could put down an 
insurrection or set up an airstrip that can accommodate B-52s with 
a week's notice. For what the United States wanted to accomplish m 
Vietnam in the 1950s, democracy was the last thing it needed. 
More than anything else, the U.S. role in subverting the 
Vietnamese election provided an early illustration of the lengths to 
which the United States would go to influence events and, at the 
same time, the limits to its self-described political morality. 
Democracy has always been the ostensible aim of U.S. foreign policy, 
but control is the real goal. After World War II, the precepts of the 
Monroe Doctrine spilled into the Eastern hemisphere and the entire 
world its sphere of influence by unilateral determination. The 
driving force, publicly at least, was the moral struggle between 
good and evil, "democracy" and Communism. But while that global 
dichotomy was the language with which the United States fought its 
moral war, the reality was somewhat different. There was a double 
standard, and it depended upon the position and the people of the 
nation involved. For Great Britain, France, Italy and the rest of 
Western Europe, Socialist governments and strong Communist 
minorities were and have always been acceptable to the United 
States, as long as NATO existed and there was no perceived chance 
of defections to the other side. Outside of Western Europe, in the 
peripheries of Latin America, Africa and Asia, U.S. policy is less 
flexible. Communism is unacceptable; neutralism is suspect. 
Western democratic principles, so highly touted, are thrown out the 
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window. The unacceptable who wm (Arbenz, Allende) or who could 
win (Ho) have the singular honor of being threatened by the world's 
moral standardbearer. Those who fall into the unacceptable 
category but are not subvertible, such as the Chinese after Mao, are 
embraced despite the murder of pro-democracy students. 
U.S. postwar foreign policy is derived not from a foundation 
of moral principles but from power; in turn, morality has been a 
selective function of power. Right and wrong, as a result, depend 
upon maintaining that power. Choosing an arena in which to wage 
this moral battle 1s then irrelevant. With a policy based upon the 
negation of another power, no arena is off-limits, no matter how 
insignificant. If the Vietnamese are our children, as Kennedy 
reasoned, then they are our reflection and we are responsible for 
their behavior. Children who behave badly are punished. 
Supporting Ho Chi Minh was poor behavior in the eyes of those 
whose hindsight was nonexistent, and electing him was tantamount 
to marrying into the wrong family. Among equals or near-equals, 
that sort of behavior is tolerated. But when you are unfortunate 
enough to be born in a country beyond the American moral 
periphery, maintaining basic human rights, such as self-
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